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INTRODUCTION 
The 1990s brought significant developments in the field of 
information technology.  These stimulated the creation of a new 
global market for electronic information services and products, 
which is occupied substantially by electronic databases.  The 
emergence of these new technological developments challenged 
many branches of the law, including intellectual property.  A 
particularly prominent part of this debate is how the law should 
address the protection of electronic databases. 
The debate over database protection in the United States can be 
traced back to the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.1  In Feist, the 
Court found “white pages” telephone directories to be non-
copyrightable.2  The Court held that the touchstone for copyright 
protection is creative originality, and that this requirement is 
constitutionally mandated.3  The Court’s determination “inevitably 
means that the copyright in a factual compilation is thin.  
Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains 
free to use the facts contained in another’s publication to aid in 
preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work does 
not feature the same selection and arrangement.”4  Feist thus ended 
the tradition in some courts of providing copyright protection 
based on the labor invested in creating the work and declared the 
deaths of the “sweat of the brow” and “industrious collection” 
doctrines.5 
The debate gained additional prominence due to a number of 
worldwide initiatives that extended or considered extending much 
more extensive legal protection for databases.  Notably, the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPs Agreement”) introduced minimum standards regarding 
copyright protection for databases.6  For several years the World 
 
 1 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 2 See id. at 340. 
 3 See id. 
 4 Id. at 349. 
 5 See id. at 359–60. 
 6 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
33 I.L.M. 81, 87–93 (1994), 1994 WL 327459 (I.L.M.) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. 
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Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) had also considered 
providing broader intellectual property rights in databases than the 
United States.7  Furthermore, the European Union’s Directive on the 
Legal Protection of Databases (“Database Directive”), adopted in 
1996, constituted the most comprehensive attempt to provide 
protection to databases.  It granted a fifteen-year, renewable sui 
generis right to prevent the extraction and utilization of raw data 
from a database.8 
The adoption of the Database Directive has sparked an ongoing 
debate over bills drafted in the U.S. Congress to address the legal 
protection of databases.9  In particular, a number of legal scholars 
have voiced their opinions on the question of how Congress should 
react to the Supreme Court’s holding in Feist and the EU’s 
subsequent enactment of the Database Directive.10  Most of this 
scholarship, however, has simply accepted the argument, advanced 
by some segments of the database industry and others, that Feist 
creates a problem, that this problem is exacerbated by the EU’s 
Database Directive, and that this problem needs to be solved.11  
Much of the scholarly discussion has also been dedicated to 
criticizing the United States’ proposed bills because of the risks 
they supposedly pose to the database industry generally and 
specifically to groups such as the scientific and educational 
 
 7 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the 
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases, at Art. I, WIPO Doc. 
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996). 
 8 See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
1996 on the legal protection of databases, art. 10(1) and 10(3), available at 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996L0009:EN:HTML. 
 9 See, e.g., Jonathan Band & Makoto Jono, The Database Protection Debate in the 
106th Congress, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 869, 887–91 (2001). 
 10 See, e.g., id. at 887–88. 
 11 See, e.g., Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act of 2003: 
Joint Hearing on H.R. 3261 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and 
Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Commerce, 
Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 
27 (2003) (statement of David Carson, General Counsel, Copyright Office of the U.S., 
Library of Cong.) [hereinafter H.R. 3261 Hearing]; see also Band & Jono, supra note 9, 
at 871. 
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communities.12  The academic debate has, therefore, also focused 
on suggesting new and improved forms of protection that Congress 
could enact.13  The United States, however, has not yet adopted 
any protective measure to remedy the alleged problem in the 
database industry. 
This Article wishes to explore the Feist decision and its 
progeny, critically analyzing courts’ decisions after Feist.  The 
Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Feist, its holdings and shortcomings.  Part II discusses 
several post-Feist cases, exploring the different approaches 
employed by courts in analyzing what if any aspects of 
compilations are copyrightable.  Part III of this Article then 
explores the creative selection and arrangement standard and the 
scope of protection granted under this standard as well as its 
application to databases.  The Article concludes with some 
suggestions and concluding remarks concerning how to bring 
about better clarity and guidance concerning copyright protection 
for databases and compilations. 
I. FEIST PUBLICATIONS, INC. V. RURAL TELEPHONE SERVICE CO. 
A. Discussion of the Court’s Decision 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. is 
recognized as the Supreme Court’s first attempt to bring order to a 
very complex and increasingly critical issue: the application of 
copyright law to factual compilations.14  In Feist, the Court found a 
“white pages” telephone directory to be non-copyrightable, holding 
that the sole basis for protection under United States copyright law 
 
 12 See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Paul Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research 
Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionistic Intellectual Property 
Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 319–21 (2003). 
 13 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works 
of Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 340 (1992) 
(suggesting a federal anticopying statute with collective licensing) [hereinafter Ginsburg, 
No Sweat]; J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 
50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 145 (1997) (suggesting a modified liability approach).   
 14 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340–41 (1991). 
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is creative originality.15  With this decision, a unanimous Supreme 
Court sounded the death knell for the “sweat of the brow doctrine,” 
also known as the “industrious collection doctrine.”16  Under these 
doctrines, the courts moved the concept of originality, with its 
focus on individuality and the creative process to the background 
and placed renewed emphasis on labor and effort as a basis for 
copyright compilations.17  Although on its face this decision 
clarified the law by invalidating the above doctrines as tests for 
assessing copyrightability in factual compilations, the availability 
of copyright for factual compilations has not become predictable or 
stable after Feist.   
Feist involved the copyrightability of a white pages telephone 
directory.18  The plaintiff and respondent, Rural Telephone Service 
Company (“Rural”), held a monopoly franchise that permitted it to 
provide telephone service to a number of communities in Kansas.19  
Pursuant to state law, Rural produced an annually updated 
telephone directory that contained a typical white pages section 
which listed the names of residents alphabetically by last name.20  
The defendant and petitioner, Feist Publications, Inc. (“Feist”), was 
a publishing company that produced area-wide telephone books.  
The directory at issue in the litigation contained over 46,000 
telephone listings and covered eleven different service areas.21  
The area covered by Feist’s directory overlapped with a portion of 
that serviced by Rural.22 
In preparing its directory, Feist successfully obtained 
permission to use the white pages from ten of the eleven telephone 
companies whose listings it wished to duplicate.23  Rural was the 
only company that refused to license its information to Feist.  This 
refusal, however, did not deter Feist from basing part of its 
 
 15 See id. at 340. 
 16 See id. at 341. 
17  See, e.g., Jeweler’s Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d 
Cir. 1922). 
 18 Feist, 499 U.S. at 340. 
 19 See id. at 342. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See id. at 343. 
 22 See id. at 342–43. 
 23 See id. at 343. 
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directory on Rural’s white pages by simply taking the desired 
portion of Rural’s listings and incorporated it into its own 
directory.24  Rural discovered the copying and subsequently sued 
Feist for copyright infringement.25  The district court found Feist 
liable,26 and the Tenth Circuit affirmed this decision.27  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, presumably to resolve a split in 
the circuits over the extent of protection available to fact works.28 
Feist presented the Court with the very conflict that the circuit 
courts had found so troubling.  The Court had two options for 
resolving this conflict.  On the one hand, it could use the “sweat of 
the brow” or “industrious collection” doctrines29 and extend 
meaningful protection to Rural,30 thereby eroding the well-
established proposition that “originality is a . . . prerequisite for 
copyright protection.”31  Or, the Court could apply the “creative 
selection” principle, derived from decisions such as Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony32 and Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co.,33 which would leave Rural with no effective 
protection against competitors like Feist who appropriated valuable 
 
 24 Id. at 342–44.  Feist’s employees conducted additional research to verify and 
augment Rural’s listings. Id. at 343–44.  Despite this, four entirely fictitious listings 
created by Rural were reproduced in Feist’s directory. Id. at 344.  This certainly supports 
Feist’s wholesale appropriation of information from Rural’s directory. 
 25 Id. at 344. 
26  Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214 (D. Kan. 1987).  
 27 Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 28 Feist, 499 U.S. at 360 (noting that, unlike the Tenth Circuit, the Second and Fifth 
circuits had rejected copyright protection for factual compilations); see also infra notes 
29–33. 
 29 Under these doctrines, copyright was a reward “for the hard work that went into 
compiling facts,” rather than for creativity and originality. See id. at 352. 
 30 One might argue that the sweat of the brow theory does not extend protection to 
Rural because Rural expended no meaningful effort in assigning and printing the 
telephone numbers of its customers.  Since state law required Rural to publish its 
directory, the cost of doing so was presumably built into the rates Rural charged its 
customers.  Denying copyright in this case would, thus, neither damage the incentives for 
producing telephone white pages nor deprive Rural of a fair economic return.  The Eighth 
Circuit, however, had expressly rejected such an argument. See Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. 
Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131–32 (8th Cir. 1985).   
 31 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 351.  
 32 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
 33 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
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information.34  Such a resolution, however, might be viewed as 
unfair and unwise as a matter of policy.35 
As the above discussion suggests, both options required the 
Court to construct justifications for its decision.  In other words, if 
the Court decided for the defendant, it would have to square its 
doctrinal choice with notions of fairness and public policy.  If it 
decided for the plaintiff, it would have to explain why it had 
chosen to ignore the guidance of its own well-established 
originality requirement.  The Court chose the former option, 
endorsing the creative selection approach. 
The Court began by restating basic doctrines.  The Court 
reviewed the history of copyright protection for compilations and 
the development of the sweat of the brow or industrious collection 
doctrines, unequivocally repudiating both doctrines.  Originality, 
the Court explained, must have two components: “independent 
creation plus a modicum of creativity.”36  However, the Court 
emphasized that the creativity requirement is extremely modest: 
To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is 
extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.  
The vast majority of works make the grade quite 
easily, as they possess some creative spark, no 
matter how crude, humble or obvious it might be.37 
The Court explained that Congress, in enacting the Copyright 
Act of 1976, intended to overrule the sweat of the brow doctrine 
and require originality in order to protect compilations.38  It 
discerned such intent, in part, from the newly introduced definition 
of “compilation” in the 1976 Act: “A work formed by the 
collection and assembling of pre-existing materials or of data that 
are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the 
 
 34 The creative selection principle affords protection only to compilations of facts 
featuring “original selection, coordination, or arrangement,” no matter how valuable the 
underlying facts themselves are. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 360 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
 35 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of 
Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1938 (1990) [hereinafter Ginsburg, 
Creation and Commerical Value].  
 36 Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. 
 37 Id. at 345 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 38 Id. at 354–56.  
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resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of 
authorship.”39  The Court then listed the elements of authorship 
that are protected in a compilation: the selection, coordination and 
arrangement of the underlying material.40  Finally, the Court 
emphasized that applying the creative selection approach to factual 
compilations: 
inevitably means that the copyright in a factual 
compilation is thin.  Notwithstanding a valid 
copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to 
use the facts contained in another’s publication to 
aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the 
competing work does not feature the same selection 
and arrangement.41 
With this very statement, the Court completely reversed earlier 
judicial approaches of a substantial minority of the circuits which 
had held that any substantial appropriation of material from a 
copyrightable compilation was an infringement.42  Relying on the 
sweat of the brow doctrine, these courts had previously required 
late-comers independently to collect material for a competing 
compilation.43  Nevertheless, the Court’s holding reflected well-
known doctrines and conclusions, embraced by the majority of 
circuit courts.  The Court, therefore, could have simply applied the 
creative selection approach of Burrow-Giles and Bleistein to the 
facts of the case and reached the same result.  The Court, however, 
chose a different path, perhaps deciding that doctrine alone was an 
 
 39 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 40 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 356–57. 
 41 Id. at 349. 
 42 See, e.g., Jeweler’s Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 281 F. 83, 88–89 
(2d Cir. 1922) (“[A] subsequent compiler is bound to set about doing for himself that 
which the first compiler has done. . . . [G]enerally he is not entitled to take one word of 
information previously published, without independently working out the matter for 
himself, so as to arrive at the same result from the same common source of information, 
and the only use that he can legitimately make of a previous publication is to verify his 
own calculations and results when obtained.”).  
43  See, e.g., Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 219 (D. Kan. 
1987) (“Courts recognize that a compiler of a directory may make fair use of an existing 
compilation if he first makes an independent canvass, then merely compares and checks 
his own compilation with that of the copyrighted publication and publishes the result 
after verifying the additional items derived from the copyrighted publication.”). 
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insufficient basis on which to uphold the creative selection 
approach.  Moving beyond statutory interpretation, the Court held 
that “[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement.”44  Citing 
nineteenth-century case law, the Court derived this requirement 
from references in the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause 
to “Writings” and “Authors.”45  The Court suggested that these 
terms “presuppose a degree of originality.”46 
But the Court went even further, explaining why the concerns 
raised by sweat of the brow proponents were outweighed by the 
Constitution’s originality requirement.47  The Court recognized the 
possible unfairness of failing to protect a compiler’s labor, but 
explained that the fact that a compiler’s labor may sometimes be 
“used without compensation by others” is “not ‘some unforeseen 
byproduct of a statutory scheme’ but is, rather, ‘the essence of 
copyright.’”48  By announcing that “[t]he primary objective of 
copyright is . . . to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts,”49 the Court endorsed the view that copyright is meant only to 
advance the public welfare and not to secure the rights of authors.  
Regarding the possibility that protecting a compiler’s labor might 
be necessary to encourage the desired production of factual 
compilations, the Court stated that the creative selection approach 
correctly implemented copyright’s policy of encouragement.50 
 
 44 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
 45 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).  The Court hinted, however, that other 
forms of protection might not be subject to the same constitutional restriction. See id. at 
354 (“Protection for the fruits of such research . . . may in certain circumstances be 
available under a theory of unfair competition.” (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & 
DAVID  NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04, at 3–23 (1990))). 
 46 Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. 
 47 Id. at 349–51. 
 48 Id. at 349 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
589 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
49  Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 50 Feist, 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (“To this end, copyright assures authors the right 
to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and 
information conveyed by a work . . . . This principle, known as the idea/expression 
dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship.  As applied to a factual compilation, 
assuming the absence of original written expression, only the compiler’s selection and 
arrangement may be protected; the raw facts may be copied at will.  This result is neither 
unfair not unfortunate.  It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of 
science and art.”).  
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Having found copyright’s originality requirement to be 
constitutionally mandated, the Court proceeded to explain how the 
sweat of the brow doctrine could not coexist with the creative 
selection approach.51  The Court went on to suggest that courts that 
had adopted the sweat of the brow doctrine simply misunderstood 
the copyright statute.52  The Court supported this conclusion by 
recapping the copyright statute’s legislative history53 that referred 
to the originality standard when it defined the phrase “original 
works of authorship.”54 
Having completed its attack on the sweat of the brow doctrine, 
the Court concluded its opinion by applying the originality/creative 
selection requirement to Feist’s compilation.  The Court reasoned 
that Rural’s case hinged on whether Feist copied anything 
“original” from Rural.55  The Court concluded that Feist did not 
copy any original material and accordingly reversed the lower 
courts.56 
Understanding how and why the Court reached its finding of 
non-infringement also uncovers its strong desire to rule on the 
selection and arrangement question.  The Court began by 
identifying what Feist copied from Rural, stating that Feist 
appropriated “1,309 names, towns, and telephone numbers from 
Rural’s white pages.”57  One might then have expected the Court to 
proceed by analyzing whether Feist borrowed any selection or 
arrangement,58 since copyright could extend only to the selection 
and arrangement of the underlying information.  However, even if 
the Court had proceeded this way, it would almost certainly still 
 
 51 Id. at 353–54. 
 52 Id. at 352 (“But some courts misunderstood the statute.  These courts ignored §§ 3 
and 4 . . . . Making matters worse, these courts developed a new theory to justify the 
protection of factual compilations.  Known alternatively as ‘sweat of the brow’ or 
‘industrious collection,’ the underlying notion was that copyright was a reward for the 
hard work that went into compiling facts.” (citing Leon v. Pac. Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th 
Cir. 1937); Jeweler’s Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 
1922))). 
 53 Id. at 354–61 
 54 Id. at 355 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102). 
 55 Id. at 361. 
 56 Id. at 363. 
 57 Id. at 361. 
 58 Feist admitted that the directory as a whole was copyrightable. See id. 
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have found for Feist as Feist had copied Rural’s underlying 
material without appropriating an original selection or 
arrangement.59  Such a finding would have been entirely consistent 
with the Court’s statement that “copyright in a factual compilation 
is thin.”60 
But, the Court did not do this.  Instead, the Court apparently 
assumed that Feist did take Rural’s selection and arrangement, if 
only to reach the question of whether Rural’s white pages selection 
and arrangement were copyrightable.  The Court concluded that 
Rural’s selection of listings was “obvious,” and its arrangement 
was “not only unoriginal, it [was] practically inevitable,”61 
explaining: 
The selection, coordination, and arrangement of 
Rural’s white pages do not satisfy the minimum 
constitutional standards for copyright protection . . . 
. Rural’s white pages are entirely typical . . . . In 
preparing its white pages, Rural simply takes the 
data provided by its subscribers and lists it 
alphabetically by surname.  The end product is a 
garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of 
even the slightest trace of creativity.62 
However, the Court acknowledged that the telephone white 
pages were an extreme case, falling into a “narrow category of 
works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as 
to be virtually nonexistent,”63 and that “the vast majority of 
compilations will pass” the originality test.64 
B. Analysis of the Decision 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Feist has three main 
components.  The first point was that one cannot acquire a 
copyright solely because of her sweat or industriousness in 
collecting the underlying material.  However, this point, though 
 
 59 See id. at 343–44. 
 60 Id. at 349. 
 61 Id. at 362–63. 
62  Id. at 362. 
 63 Id. at 359. 
 64 Id. 
C03_BITTON_ 20110425 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  6:41 PM 
622 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 21:611 
important, is hardly earth shaking.  As I have argued elsewhere, a 
historical analysis reveals that most circuit courts had already 
reached the same conclusion prior to the Court’s decision in 
Feist.65  In fact, only a small number of courts had granted 
copyright protection to factual compilations based on the sweat or 
industriousness expended by the compiler, with such decisions 
generally only granted in response to the pleas of producers of 
telephone directories and maps who claimed they had labored hard 
to produce their works.66  In these cases, apparently moved by the 
equities of the cases, courts purported to rely on copyright law to 
justify their holdings, although their reasoning seems to be more in 
line with the misappropriation doctrine enunciated in cases such as 
International News Service v. Associated Press.67 
“The second point in the Feist decision was that the Court held 
that a second compiler does not infringe a copyright when using 
facts gathered by a first compiler.”68  This decision, however, was 
also unexceptional given the reality that copyright law has not 
protected facts under the 1909 Copyright Act and subsequent 
copyright statutes,69 a point I have argued previously.70  Requiring 
people to repeat all of the necessary time-consuming steps taken to 
gather information is simply inefficient. 
The last and most important point in the Court’s analysis was 
the Court’s constitutionalization of the originality requirement in 
copyright law.  “Although it was clearly unnecessary to decide the 
case on constitutional grounds since statutory grounds would have 
sufficed, the Court held that the Constitution required a minimum 
amount of originality or creativity in order for a work to be eligible 
for copyright protection.”71  Indeed, prior to Feist, no other cases 
 
 65 Miriam Bitton, Trends in Protection for Informational Works Under Copyright Law 
During the 19th and 20th Centuries, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 115 (2006). 
[hereinafter Bitton, Trends]. 
66  Id. 
 67 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 68 Bitton, Trends, supra note 65, at 172. 
69  Id. at 136 (showing that “[t]he prevailing approach under the 1909 Act, even in 
those courts adhering strictly to the industrious collection doctrine, was that facts and 
other indispensable materials are uncopyrightable”). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
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had stated explicitly that originality is constitutionally mandated, 
though one could argue that the Court’s decision in Sarony 
suggested this implicitly.72 
“Feist thus sounded the death knell for the sweat of the brow 
doctrine.”73  One might even be surprised that it took the Court 200 
years to arrive at such a fundamental decision given the many 
opportunities it had to explain the terms “Author” and “Writings.”  
However, when one examines the legal landscape and historical 
context within which Feist was decided, one begins to understand 
why the Court likely viewed constitutionalization of the originality 
requirement as necessary,74 even if Feist was not necessarily the 
 
 72 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (“We 
entertain no doubt that the constitution is broad enough to cover an act authorizing 
copyright of photographs, so far as they are representatives of original intellectual 
conceptions of the author.”); Bitton, Trends, supra note 65, at 128–29. 
 73 See Bitton, Trends, supra note 65, at 179. 
 74 But see Robert Kreiss, Copyright Protection for Computer Databases, CD-ROMS 
And Factual Compilations, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 323, 327 (1992) (arguing that the 
Court in Feist failed to deal with the possibility that constitutional grant of power to 
Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” might contain some 
breathing room and that the Copyright Clause could have been interpreted broadly so that 
Congress could give copyright protection to some works whose originality is 
questionable in order to ensure that no worthwhile work (i.e., one which contributes to 
the “progress of science”) is left out); Leo J. Raskind, Assessing the Impact of Feist, 17 
U. DAYTON L. REV. 331, 336 (1992) (arguing that the main flaw of the Feist opinion is its 
failure to illuminate the process of gathering information and that failure to recognize that 
gathering of information at issue in this and other cases involves the exercise of 
judgment, which goes to the root of copyright protection); Benjamin B. Thorner, 
Copyright Protection for Computer Databases: The Threat of Feist and a Proposed 
Solution, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 27 (1997) (arguing that “the idea that functional writings 
are unprotectable by copyright is wrongheaded as it hampers creators’ incentives to 
profitably bring their goods to the public”); Russ VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox: 
Feist, “Creativity,” and the Legislative History of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 549 (1995) (questioning the validity of the “creativity” premise of the Court in Feist 
and arguing that the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act suggests that the 
drafters did not intend “creativity” to be a required element of copyrightability); Timothy 
Young, Copyright Law: Copyright Protection for Factual Compilations: The White 
Pages of the Phone Book Are Not Original Enough to Be Copyrighted—But Why?, 17 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 631, 655–58 (1992) (arguing, inter alia, that the Feist decision required 
a higher level of originality than is congressionally mandated); Anant S. Narayanan, 
Note, Standards of Protection for Databases in the European Community and the United 
States: Feist and the Myth of Creative Originality, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 
457, 489–91 (1993–1994) (arguing that legislative history and congressional inaction 
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“best” factual scenario for establishing order and guidance within 
the problematic field of compilation copyright. 
“Feist was decided in 1991, exactly when major developments 
and breakthroughs in the fields of computers, telecommunications, 
and information technologies, as well as the commercialization of 
the Internet, were rapidly taking place.”75  The opinion in Feist, 
thus, both reflected and signaled the beginning of a new era of 
coherence, one which emphasized the constitutional dimensions 
constraining intellectual property law doctrines.  The opinion also 
reflected the great uneasiness with and intolerance of the 
industrious collection doctrine that allowed the capture and 
enclosure of facts—our building blocks of knowledge—and 
signaled a shift away from a focus on the proprietary dimension of 
copyright in favor of dissemination of information and ideas.76  
Therefore, as I have argued elsewhere, while the industrious 
collection doctrine might have been a necessity during the era of 
pre-digital, old-fashioned compilations—those in which database 
producers did not have the tools at their disposal to recoup their 
investment in the creation of their products—Feist represented the 
realization that such reasoning is inapplicable to modern electronic 
databases.77  A constitutionally-mandated originality requirement 
anticipated and prevented the possibility that interest groups would 
try to press Congress to pass legislation protecting these building 
blocks of knowledge.  Indeed, almost all the bills introduced to 
cope with the database protection “problem” thus far have failed 
mainly because they could not have withstood constitutional 
 
suggest that the Court’s creative originality requirement is not constitutionally 
mandated). 
 75 Bitton, Trends, supra note 65, at 173. 
 76 See Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Serv. of Am. Inc., 940 F.2d 1471, 
1481 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated, 949 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1991).  Viewing Feist as 
revolutionizing the law of copyright, the panel in Cable News Network was persuaded 
that Feist signaled a shift away from a focus on the proprietary nature of copyright, in 
favor of dissemination of information and ideas. Id. at 1478.  Using this as a 
philosophical basis, the court concluded that Cable News Network had no copyright in 
the news of the day, which apparently included Cable News Network’s own news clips 
and its own reports of the news. Id. at 1485.  See also David O. Carson, Copyright 
Protection for Factual Compilations After Feist: A Practitioner’s View, 17 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 969, 980 (1992). 
 77 Bitton, Trends, supra note 65, at 173. 
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challenges after Feist.78  The Court thus seems to have envisioned 
the challenges and technological advances that were to come.  The 
origins of the jurisprudence inherent in Feist, therefore, necessarily 
lie in twentieth century achievements, rather than those of the 
nineteenth century. 
Nonetheless, despite these important (and largely predictable) 
aspects of Feist, the Supreme Court offered no guidance to the 
lower courts on the question of creativity in the selection and 
arrangement of compilations since it articulated the originality 
standard by choosing the weakest possible case: that of a white-
pages directory.  The following discussion details some of the most 
notable problems with the decision’s fact pattern. 
First, Feist proved a poor case for the Court to discuss 
copyright protection in fact works as it involved no real sweat from 
 
 78 The most recent U.S. bill for database protection was the Database and Collections 
of Information Misappropriation Act of 2003, H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. (2003) (The bill 
passed the House Judiciary Committee on Jan. 21, 2004.  This bill adopts a pure 
misappropriation approach, modeled almost literally after the Second Circuit’s test 
formulated in Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).  
Former database protection bills are: Database Investment and Intellectual Property 
Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996) (The professed goal of the bill 
was to prevent actual or threatened competitive injury by misappropriating a database or 
its contents and it proposed a twenty-five-year term of protection.  The bill was met with 
ample criticism and finally failed, mainly because it contained inadequate exceptions or 
privileges to protect the public interest and because the drafters of the bill did not consult 
with the relevant scientific and educational communities.); Collection of Information 
Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1997) (Although the legislation was styled as a 
misappropriation bill based on a tort rather than an intellectual property right theory, the 
substantive tests were almost identical to those of H.R. 3531.  This bill received support 
from a limited number of large database publishers, but was eventually dropped due to 
concerns voiced by some government agencies.); Consumer and Investor Access to 
Information Act of 1999, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999) (designed to provide protection 
only against unauthorized commercial uses that were “in competition” with the protected 
database and would have protected only against duplication of another’s database.  The 
bill contained exceptions for news reporting use and for scientific, educational, and 
research uses, but did not contain a general exception for unauthorized “fair uses” and a 
limited term of protection.  The lack of these last two ingredients might have made this 
bill more vulnerable than H.R. 354 to a facial First Amendment challenge.); Collection of 
Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999) (Designed broadly to protect 
investment in databases against unauthorized uses that cause material harm, it prohibited 
the unauthorized use of “all or a substantial part” of a protected database.  The bill 
contained exceptions for news reporting use and for scientific, educational, and research 
uses.  It also contained general exception for fair use and a limited term of protection.). 
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Rural’s brow and thus no free riding by Feist.  Whereas in the past, 
creating a “white pages” directory was a labor-intensive mission, 
requiring lots of people with file cards to handle, assemble, and 
check individual phone listings,79 today’s phone information is 
digital.  In the digital era, telephone companies are not engaged in 
the same labor-intensive task for creating telephone directories.  
Such directories can easily be created based on the companies’ 
client data.80  Therefore, Feist did not really involve “sweat of the 
brow” or human effort as historically understood.81  Additionally, 
the Feist case did not exemplify the classical free rider scenario.  
The classical free rider scenario assumes that late-comers use 
authors’ work product without paying the authors, thus benefitting 
from their work without sharing the authors’ production costs.  In 
Feist, Feist actually licensed ten out of the eleven telephone 
directories and clearly attempted to license Rural’s directory rather 
than copy it for free.82 
The second problem lies in the fact that the data at issue in 
Feist was generated by a government-created monopolist (Rural), 
which was required by law to produce this information but refused 
to license it.83  State-licensed monopolies such as Rural do not 
require incentives to create directories since there are mandatory 
requirements to produce such information as well as the possibility 
of revenue received from advertising or other readily available 
business models.84  In fact, even if no possibility of advertising 
revenue existed, and certainly before the rise of the Internet, 
consumers would probably be willing to pay for the production of 
phone books.  It is important to emphasize that in the 
Telecommunication Act of 1996, Congress solved Feist’s holdout 
 
 79 Symposium, Panel I: Database Protection, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 275, 296 (2001); see also Jeweler’s Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g 
Co., 274 F. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff’d, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 
581 (1922) (upholding copyright protection in a compilation of the names and addresses 
of jewelers which “was the result of considerable past labor” by the compiler-plaintiff 
and which featured “original illustrations made by the plaintiff.”). 
 80 See Panel I: Database Protection, supra note 79, at 296. 
81  Id. 
 82 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 343 (1991). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 342. 
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problem regarding telephone subscribers’ information by requiring 
telecommunication carriers to provide non-discriminatory access to 
telephone numbers and directory listings,85 thereby ensuring that 
such information remain accessible to others. 
Third, the Feist Court dealt with the easiest type of directory: a 
white pages directory, organized in alphabetical order, lacking 
minimal creativity.86  The nature of the case thus made the need to 
provide guidelines regarding creativity in compilations extraneous 
to the holding, a fact that has since proven to be one of the major 
weaknesses of the decision.  For example, soon after the Court 
decided Feist, a series of cases “pop[ped] up throughout the federal 
circuit” courts that seemed especially suited to follow from the 
precedent set in Feist.87  “However, the stability and clarity that the 
Court seemed to promise proved to be short-lived”88 because while 
factually similar, different circuits decided those cases 
differently.89  Thus, while the Court’s decision in Feist did succeed 
in ending the split among circuit courts regarding the continued 
viability of the industrious collection doctrine, the Court created 
ambiguity as to the exact standard of originality required for 
copyright protection for selection and arrangement of information 
in fact works.90  The result: continued division and uncertainty 
regarding the copyrightability of compilations. 
Fourth, by holding that “obvious” selection and arrangement is 
not copyrightable,91 the Court implicitly introduced uncertainty as 
 
 85 Telecommunication Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222(e) (2006). 
86  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991) (“Given that 
some works must fail [copyright’s minimal creativity test], we cannot imagine a more 
likely candidate.  Indeed, were we to hold that Rural’s white pages pass muster, it is hard 
to believe that any collection of facts could fail.”). 
87  Ethan R. York, Note, Warren Publishing, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp.: Continuing 
the Stable Uncertainty of Copyright in Factual Compilations, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
565, 565 (1999). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 585 (arguing that while Feist may have “ended ‘the seventy year split among 
circuits’ concerning sweat of the brow versus creative selection/arrangement theory, the 
Court may have created a new seventy year split by not providing further clarification in 
the standards of originality it proclaimed” (quoting Tracy Lea Meade, Ex-Post Feist: 
Application of a Landmark Copyright Decision, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 245, 251–52 
(1994))). 
91  Feist, 499 U.S. at 362. 
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to the level of copyright protection available to fact works which 
demonstrate less obvious selection and arrangement.  Indeed, Feist 
suggests that the work’s copyright status is dynamic rather than 
static and that over time a fact work can become an industry 
standard or convention, and as a result, might lose its protection.  
For example, the first creator of a telephone directory could have 
been perceived as an author of an original work of authorship by 
organizing her compilation in an original way not known or used 
before.  However, over time, with the widespread adoption of 
alphabetically organized telephone directories, such organization 
became an industry standard.  One can imagine a new 
copyrightable organization or selection for fact works being found 
unoriginal during its lifetime. 
Fifth and last, the Court failed to articulate what is considered a 
“fact” and why telephone subscribers’ information is factual in 
nature.  The Court’s failure to address these seemingly basic and 
simple questions created many problems later on as the following 
discussion will demonstrate. 
II. FEIST’S PROGENY 
The ambiguous decision thus left some, including members of 
the information industry, unsatisfied.  They argued that while the 
Court’s decision in Feist established that originality in selection 
and arrangement precludes copying but does not preclude using the 
underlying factual materials of compilations,92 they were still left 
with no meaningful copyright protection since “mechanical” 
selection and arrangement are insufficient to meet the creativity 
requirement.93  Indeed, the Court’s analysis did fail to provide 
 
 92 See id. at 349–350 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 556–57 (1985)). 
93  See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak 
Connection Between Copyright and the Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1343, 1374–75 (“[T]here is no particular reason to think that the creative selection 
approach directs copyright to compilations whose production genuinely requires 
encouragement.  If anything, it would seem that the sweat theory, which the Court 
rejected, is better related to the need for encouragement because the amount of a 
compiler’s labor bears some relationship to the size of development costs.  Significant 
sweat would imply large development costs, which in turn would suggest that a compiler 
would face difficulty in recouping those costs.  This realization exposes as questionable 
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guidelines for evaluating whether a compilation meets the original 
selection and arrangement test, leaving such decisions to the lower 
courts.  Accordingly, lower courts were left with two critical 
unanswered questions: what constitutes creativity in selection and 
arrangement, and, assuming that this threshold is met, what sort of 
copying does it prevent?  Courts’ decisions following Feist provide 
answers to these questions. 
Since I have discussed the arguments regarding the need for 
copyright protection in fact works elsewhere,94 the focus of this 
Article is limited to an assessment of the strength of copyright 
protection for compilations under the above-mentioned creativity 
standard in selection and arrangement within post-Feist case law.  
The discussion closely examines this case law by first distilling the 
standards that were developed regarding the selection and 
arrangement test.  It describes the courts’ search for creative 
selection based on either the subjective decisions involved in 
determining the compilations’ criteria or the conscious exclusion 
from the compilation of some data that meets the objective criteria 
of the compilation.  It also explores the courts’ struggle to define a 
creative arrangement standard based on data’s arrangement in a 
non-mechanical or subjective manner.   
The discussion then deals with the courts’ struggles in applying 
these tests (and Feist’s proscription of copyright protection in facts 
themselves)95 to define the “fact,” “idea,” and “expression” of 
compilations.96  Professor Ginsburg has argued that the definitions 
 
any assertion that the creative selection approach’s application to factual compilations 
strongly promotes “the progress of Science and useful Arts.” (citations omitted)); see 
generally Miriam Bitton, A New Outlook on the Economic Dimension of the Database 
Protection Debate, 47 IDEA 93 (2006) [hereinafter Bitton, A New Outlook]. 
 94 See generally id. 
 95 See, e.g., CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 
(2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 
700 (2d Cir. 1991); Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., 945 F.2d 509 
(2d Cir. 1991). 
 96 See, e.g., Ginsburg, No Sweat, supra note 13, at 346 (“In copyright law, an ‘idea’ is 
not an epistemological concept, but a legal conclusion prompted by notions—often 
unarticulated and unproven—of appropriate competition.  Thus, copyright doctrine 
attaches the label ‘idea’ to aspects of works which, if protected, would (or, we fear, 
might) preclude, or render too expensive, subsequent authors’ endeavors.”).   
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of the above terms were based on public policy considerations.97  
Such considerations, she claims, reflected an attempt to draw a 
proper balance between incentives to create and access the 
building blocks of future works.98  This Article suggests that a 
careful, closer examination of these cases reveals that many of 
these decisions were wrongly decided and are a source of concern.  
Though purporting to follow Feist’s legacy and provide greater 
access to materials constituting building blocks of knowledge via 
newly created distinctions between different kinds of facts, these 
cases instead seem to exhibit disloyalty to the holding and spirit of 
Feist, providing protection to works that do not meet Feist’s 
threshold of creativity, and introducing uncertainty and 
incoherence to copyright law jurisprudence.99 
The discussion concludes with an introduction to and a 
description of the new and improved “intent test” for identification 
of unprotectable “facts” and “ideas” and protectable “expression” 
in compilations.  The scope of copying that is prevented under the 
creative selection and arrangement standard is also explored and 
the application of the standard and its scope of protection as 
formulated by the courts regarding electronic databases is 
examined. 
 
97  Id. 
 98 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of 
Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (1997).  Discussing 
the Second Circuit’s distinction between types of ideas, the author suggests that, for the 
court, a “soft” idea is one whose privatization by copyright is tolerable because it “do[es] 
not materially assist the understanding of future thinkers.  The court has come close to 
acknowledging that an idea in copyright law is not an epistemological concept; it is a 
legal conclusion informed by public policy notions of what is necessary to stimulate 
creations of works in the first place, while still leaving room for subsequent innovation.” 
Id. at 153–54 (quoting CCC, 44 F.3d at 71).  
 99 Subjective is defined as “[p]roceeding from or taking place within an individual’s 
mind and unaffected by the outside world.” AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 677 
(1983).  Because these decisions are based on functional considerations, they are 
certainly affected by the outside world and are not subjective.   
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A. The Creative Selection and Arrangement Standard 
1. Development of the Standard in Courts’ Decisions 
Examination of major decisions in both the Second and 
Eleventh Circuits show that these courts and others that followed 
them required the compiler to have made subjective decisions in 
compiling the directory in order to meet Feist’s creativity 
threshold.100  Standards that search for subjective elements attempt 
to identify the “person” in the work, meaning the elements of a 
work that stem from a person.  Thus creative selection requires 
showing either the presence of subjective decisions in determining 
the criteria of the compilation or conscious exclusion from the 
compilation of some data that meets the objective criteria of the 
compilation.101  Similarly, creative arrangement requires the 
compiler to arrange data in a subjective or non-mechanical 
manner.102  The underlying assumptions of the “subjective 
decisions” standards are that works whose facts are selected or 
arranged in an objective manner do not reflect their creator’s 
personality and, even if one assumed that they did, objective 
selection or arrangement criteria permit the facts in the works at 
issue to be expressed in only a very limited number of ways.103  
 
 100 See Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 
(11th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1101 (1994); Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991); Eckes v. Card Prices 
Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862–63 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding the exercise of judgment in 
selecting a set of “premium” baseball cards worthy of copyright protection); see also 1 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID  NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.04[B] (Matthew 
Bender rev. ed. 2010) (examining opinions which found originality in selection and 
emphasizing the necessity of “subjective judgment”); Ginsburg, Creation and 
Commercial Value, supra note 35, at 1896 (describing selection and arrangement as “a 
test of subjective authorship”); Jack B. Hicks, Note, Copyright and Computer Databases: 
Is Traditional Compilation Law Adequate?, 65 TEX. L. REV. 993, 1005 (1987) (noting 
that “under the subjective selection standard expression is found in the actions taken to 
collect information” (emphasis added)).  
101  1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID  NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.04[B] 
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010) (noting that “the requisite originality may inhere in 
selection or arrangement alone, even if the other ingredient is lacking”). 
102  See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 682 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen it comes to the selection or arrangement of information, creativity 
inheres in making non-obvious choices from among more than a few options.”). 
 103 See, e.g., Key Publ’ns, 945 F.2d at 513. 
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This leads to the application of the merger doctrine and results in 
the denial of copyright protection for such works.104  “Subjective 
decisions” standards also assume that providing protection to 
objectively dictated selection and arrangement of factual 
compilations provides, in practice, protection to the least valuable 
elements of the work. 
Loyalty to such standards and their underlying assumptions 
would keep the most valuable aspects of the work free for use by 
all.  However, courts’ decisions in applying these standards, 
oftentimes providing protection to works that should not have been 
protected, illustrate their failure to understand Feist’s underlying 
rationales.  The Second Circuit’s decision in Key Publications, Inc. 
v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises,105 which provided 
protection to a classified business directory used by New York 
City’s Chinese-American community,106 and the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley 
Information Publishing, Inc.107 which denied protection to a yellow 
pages directory, provide excellent examples of two cases with 
identical factual scenarios that were decided differently. 
In Key Publications, the Second Circuit examined whether  
defendant Galore infringed plaintiff Key’s classified business 
directory intended for use by New York City’s Chinese-American 
 
104  See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 105 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 106 Id. at 512. 
 107 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719 
(7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the selection of factual information in a title commitment 
did not merit copyright protection since the selection of facts to include was not a matter 
of discretion grounded in the title company’s personal judgment or taste, but was dictated 
by convention and industry standards.  Title examiners had to list all of the facts that 
could affect the marketability of a title); Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 
39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1714 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that a list of dental procedures did not 
constitute a creatively original selection because no selection can be discerned when the 
list was intended to be comprehensive); Skinder-Strauss Assocs. v. Mass. Continuing 
Legal Educ., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 665, 676 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding that a publisher of a 
legal directory “did not exercise even a minimal degree of creativity in a Feistian sense” 
in selecting only actively practicing Massachusetts attorneys and in omitting those who 
were retired or suspended and in selecting other information in the directory, such as 
attorney name, address, telephone, and fax numbers since such information was not 
original but was rather “determined by forces external to the compiler”). 
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community.108  Noting that original selection involves judgment in 
choosing what from a body of data to include in a compilation,109 
 
108  Key Publ’ns, 945 F.2d at 512. 
 109 Id. at 513; see also Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 470 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding 
creative selection in the words included in a book since the plaintiff selected the words 
included in his book from numerous variations of hundreds of available terms in fifteenth 
century works based on subjective, informed, and creative judgment); Eckes v. Card 
Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding selectivity in the designation of 
5,000 cards as “premium” from among 18,000 baseball cards); Nester’s Map & Guide 
Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 796 F. Supp. 729, 733 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding creative 
selection in the selections of both street address listings and out-of-town destinations in a 
New York City taxi driver’s guide since the plaintiff showed creativity in assigning 
approximate numbers to building addresses at chosen intersections and used its 
knowledge and judgment in making its choice regarding specific useful out-of-town 
destinations); Budish v. Gordon, 784 F. Supp. 1320, 1333 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (finding 
creative selection in the selection of data contained in tables in a copyrighted book on 
Medicaid planning since the plaintiff chose relevant data from the Governor’s Report and 
discarded what he felt was unnecessary).  Also, see the following cases which went along 
the same line of analysis: Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674 
(2d Cir. 1998) (“Bender I”) and Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 
F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Bender II”).  In both cases the Second Circuit denied copyright 
protection to the selection and arrangement of many of West’s case reports.  In Bender I, 
the defendant published HyperLaw, a CD-ROM compilation of federal decisions. 158 
F.3d at 677.  It copied the text of the opinions from West, but deleted West’s syllabi, 
headnotes, and key numbers. Id. at 677–78.  Hyperlaw, however, did copy other 
enhancement features that West typically adds to the judicial texts: information about 
parties, counsel, court, and date of decision; annotations about subsequent procedural 
developments; and the editing of parallel citations in the reported cases to ensure 
uniformity of style. Id. at 678.  West argued that each enhancement feature reflected 
creative choices. Id. at 681.  The Second Circuit disagreed, affirming the district court’s 
grant of declaratory relief to HyperLaw. Id. at 689.  The court held that all of the 
information was factual in nature, and that the information was not compiled or arranged 
with even the minimal creativity required by Feist. Id. at 685.  On the contrary, every 
decision that West made about format or arrangement was dictated by convention. Id. at 
677.  While West’s work “entails considerable scholarly labor and care,” the court 
observed, “creativity in the task of creating a useful case report can only proceed in a 
narrow groove.” Id. at 688.  But see West Publ’g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 
1219 (8th Cir. 1986) where West had established a compilation copyright in the 
arrangement of cases in its National Reporter System; Oasis Publ’g Co. v. West Publ’g 
Co., 924 F. Supp. 918 (D. Minn. 1996) in which the court upheld the court’s rulings in 
the pre-Feist case discussed above.  In Bender II, however, the Second Circuit rejected 
claims identical to those that had been endorsed in Oasis and the earlier Mead Data 
decisions.  The court held that a work that simply permits a user “to re-arrange the 
material into the copyrightholder’s arrangement,” does not amount to an infringing 
copy—an issue never addressed in Oasis. Bender II, 158 F.3d at 702.  Bender could not 
be charged with contributory infringement because West had failed to identify any 
primary infringer.  Finally, the court criticized the Oasis, Mead Data notion that a work 
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the court held that the plaintiff’s exclusion of businesses that it did 
not think would remain open very long was sufficiently original.110  
However, this exclusion does not seem to be truly subjective since 
the plaintiff’s decision was the result of purely functional 
considerations—the plaintiff wanted to provide consumers with a 
directory that included only relevant, useful data.111   
The court examined whether the plaintiff’s work exhibited 
creative arrangement, explaining that original “[a]rrangement 
‘refers to the ordering or grouping of data into lists or categories 
that go beyond the mere mechanical grouping of data as such, for 
example, the alphabetical, chronological, or sequential listings of 
data.’”112  Applying this standard in Key Publications, the court 
wrongly concluded that while Key’s directory was in a format 
“common to most classified directories,”113 its “arrangement [was] 
in no sense mechanical, but involved creativity on the part of [the 
plaintiff] in deciding which categories to include and under what 
name.”114 
However, functional considerations dictate both the decisions 
regarding which categories to include and under what headings.  
Producers of such business directories usually make such decisions 
based on the intuitiveness of such choices to consumers.  They use 
conventional, accepted—and thus, predictable—categories so 
consumers can easily find the information they seek.115  Therefore, 
 
which can supplant the original, is by definition, a copy.  These cases, the Second Circuit 
held, have no basis, other than the defunct “sweat of the brow” doctrine. Bender II, 158 
F.3d at 708.   
 110 See Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 513 (2d 
Cir. 1991).     
111 Id. In this context I consider “functional” considerations to constitute objective 
rather than subjective selection because the compiler has no real choice in making such 
decisions.  
 112 Id. (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR REGISTRATION OF FACT-
BASED COMPILATIONS 1 (Rev. Oct.  11, 1989)).   
 113 Id. at 514. 
 114 Id.  
 115 See Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value, supra note 35, at 1868 n.13 
(arguing that the “[p]ersonality-based characterizations of many [factual compilations] 
seem contrived”).  In Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., the Seventh Circuit, a sweat 
of the brow court before Feist, clearly invoked the sweat of the brow doctrine in the guise 
of originality after Feist. 88 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996).  The court held that the ingredient 
lists in recipes contained in a cookbook holding a compilation copyright were not 
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while the court found originality in the compiler’s work, the case 
can easily be made that such “originality” was dictated by purely 
functional considerations, suggesting essentially that the directory 
was organized based on objective criteria and thus should not have 
been protectable. 
In contrast to Key Publications, the Eleventh Circuit, in its 
decision in Bellsouth, found no original selection and arrangement 
in a yellow pages directory, seeming to understand the flaws in 
such an approach.116  In Bellsouth, the court held that the 
defendant’s entry into a computer of all of the names, addresses, 
and telephone numbers of advertisers in the plaintiff’s yellow 
pages telephone directory, together with business type and type of 
advertisement, did not constitute copyright infringement.117   
 The court’s analysis focused on the question of whether the 
plaintiff’s selection, coordination, and arrangement, which the 
plaintiff claimed were infringed, were protectable and copied by 
 
protectable because they were statements of fact.  Furthermore, the directions for 
combining ingredients were not protectable because they were procedures and processes.  
Discussing the basic principles of compilation copyright, the court cited Feist for the 
proposition that “[t]he creative energies that an author may independently devote to the 
arrangement or compilation of facts may warrant copyright protection for that particular 
compilation.” Id. at 480.  This proposition focuses on the effort involved in creating the 
compilation, not the creativity of the result.  Furthermore, the court stated “a 
compilation’s originality flows from the efforts of ‘industrious collection’ by its author.” 
Id.  For this principle, the court cited Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., which in turn 
cited Jeweler’s Circular Publishing, the seminal case describing the sweat of the brow 
theory. Id.; Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 140 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that creativity in constructing maps arose from verifying preexisting maps generated by 
the U.S. Geological Survey); United States Payphone, Inc. v. Execs. Unlimited, Inc., 18 
U.S.P.Q.2d 2049 (4th Cir. 1991).  The Fourth Circuit, an “unaligned” circuit before Feist, 
held that U.S. Payphone’s guidebook to the coin-operated telephone market was 
copyrightable. Id. at 2051.  The district court had found that “the Guide . . . [was] the 
result of hundreds of hours of reviewing, analyzing, and interpreting state tariffs and 
regulations of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.” Id. at 2050.  In addition, the 
court noted, “Payphone produced 2700 pages of documents relating to the review, 
selection, coordination and arrangement of the compiled data which ultimately it 
organized in a ‘simple and readable format’ of fifty-one pages.” Id.  Based on these 
findings, the appellate court held that Payphone’s selection and organization of the 
material met the minimal standard for creative originality enunciated in Feist. Id. at 2051. 
 116 See Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 
(11th Cir. 1993). 
117  Id. at 1442. 
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the defendant.  The court found that the plaintiff’s selection of 
listings by establishing a closing date for changes, determining the 
geographic scope of the directory, and limiting listings to 
subscribers of its business telephone service did not meet the 
creativity threshold required by Feist.118  Such a decision perhaps 
resulted from an understanding that the above elements were all 
functional considerations that do not entail any subjectivity.  
Moreover, the court did not consider these elements to be “acts of 
authorship, but techniques for the discovery of facts.”119  
Accordingly, the court concluded, these elements were not entitled 
to copyright protection since “protection of copyright must inhere 
in a creatively original selection of facts to be reported and not in 
the creative means used to discover those facts.”120 
As for the directory’s arrangement, the court found it to be 
unoriginal and to have merged with the idea of a business directory 
since it was “in an alphabetized list of business types, with 
individual businesses listed in alphabetical order under the 
applicable headings.”121  However, since there was insufficient 
evidence to establish that the defendant copied the headings used 
in the plaintiff’s directory, the court did not rule on their 
protectability.122 
Similarly, in Victor Lalli Enterprises, Inc. v. Big Red Apple 
Inc.,123 the Second Circuit did not extend copyright protection to a 
publisher of charts comprised of the “lucky numbers” derived from 
gambling operations.124  In that case, the plaintiff published a chart 
that contained winning numbers that were determined by gambling 
activity at local racetracks; the numbers were the last three digits 
 
 118 Id. at 1441. 
119  Id. 
 120 Id.  
 121 Id. at 1442. 
 122 Id. at 1444; see also Martindale-Hubbell, Inc. v. Dunhill Int’l List Co., Inc., No. 88-
6767-CIV(NCR), 1994 U.S. Dist LEXIS 21485, at *19 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 1993) (relying 
on Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp., the court held that defendant’s copying of all the 
names and addresses of lawyers in the plaintiff’s directory, together with certain 
“correlating data” (attorney specialization, title, firm composition and structure) was not 
infringing since those elements were all unprotectable facts).   
 123 936 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 124 Id. at 673. 
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of the total sum of money bet each day at New York racetracks for 
the previous thirteen months.125  The numbers were displayed in a 
grid with the months of the year in a row across the top of the chart 
and the days of the month, from one to thirty-one, in a vertical 
column.126  There were numerous publishers of such charts.127  The 
numbers were computed according to a formula that was standard 
in that industry so the information presented in competing charts 
did not vary at all.128  The court held that the plaintiff’s selection, 
coordination, and arrangement of these numbers failed to meet the 
creativity requirement129 since the plaintiff arranged the factual 
data into “purely functional grids that offer[ed] no opportunity for 
variation,”130 and as such, like Rural’s listings, were considered to 
be “‘mechanical,’ ‘typical,’ and ‘garden variety,’” and, hence, not 
protectable.131 
Likewise, in Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc.,132 the court 
found that a decision to publish a collection of all of Dorothy 
Parker’s unpublished poetry did not reflect the compiler’s 
creativity in the selection process because it employed an objective 
criterion for determining which poems to include.133  Because there 
was only one way to publish the complete collection of the poet’s 
unpublished works, the court reasoned, the compilation was 
uncopyrightable.134  Therefore, when exhaustive, a compilation is 
automatically denied protection.  The court also rejected 
Silverstein’s contention that he had to use his subjective judgment 
to determine what was or was not a poem holding that 
“Silverstein’s choices were obvious ones that required no 
 
 125 Id. at 672. 
 126 Id. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. 
 129 Id. at 673. 
 130 Victor Lalli Enters., Inc., 936 F.2d at 673. 
 131 Id.; see also Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1346 
(5th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that Feist’s definition of originality suggests that a work can 
be original when there are other ways of expression or products available in the market 
and holding that the work was original because there were other structural engineering 
programs available in the market).   
 132 522 F. Supp. 2d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 133 Id. at 599. 
134  Id. (“[T]he collection of all is not a selection.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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subjective judgment.”135  By contrast, in Bensbargains.net, LLC v. 
XPBargains.com,136 the court suggested that when the selection 
criteria is not select all, but rather there exists some selection 
criteria that excludes some information, then it is likely that 
originality will be found.137  In this case, carefully selecting deals 
to include on a website led the court to hold that the compilation of 
the deals on the plaintiff’s website was creative.138 
Lastly, in Warren Publishing, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp.,139 
the Eleventh Circuit held plaintiff Warren’s directory of cable 
television systems and their owners to be non-copyrightable and 
not infringed.140  The defendant, Microdos, marketed an electronic 
database of information on the cable television industry called the 
“Factbook.”141  Warren claimed infringement as to the 
communities chosen and as to its designation of “lead community” 
to indicate the primary community served by a given cable 
operator where that operator served multiple communities.142  The 
district court found that “the selection of . . . communities was 
creative and protectable because Warren use[d] a unique system in 
selecting the communities that [would] be represented in the 
Factbook.”143 
Reversing the District Court, the Eleventh Circuit held that, to 
the extent that the district court was correct in characterizing 
Warren’s claim as relating to a system of selecting communities, 
section 102(b) of the Copyright Act would bar protection since the 
statute expressly excludes “any . . . system” from copyright 
 
135  Silverstein, 522 F. Supp. 2d 579, 599–600 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).   
 136 2007 U.S. Dist., LEXIS 60544 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2007). 
137  Id. at *16. 
 138 Id. at *7. 
 139 115 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc).  
 140 Id. at 1513. But see York, supra note 88, at 588 (arguing that the Eleventh Circuit 
reached the wrong result in Warren since it relied on a several rationales that are 
inconsistent with Feist and copyright law in general and created too high of a standard for 
originality). 
141  Warren Publ’g, 115 F.3d at 1511. 
 142 Id. at 1512.  Warren had also claimed infringement as to the data fields and the data 
field entries, but the district court found that Microdos had not infringed the data field 
format and that the data field entries were unprotectable fields. Id. at 113–14. 
 143 Id. at 1516 (citation omitted).   
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protection “regardless of the form in which it is . . . embodied.”144  
Even if Warren’s selection process was not a “system” within the 
meaning of the statute, the court held, Warren’s selection was not 
original and thus non-protectable.145  The Eleventh Circuit found 
that Warren “did not exercise any creativity or judgment in 
‘selecting’ cable systems to include in its Factbook, but rather 
included the entire relevant universe known to it,” thus employing 
objective, rather than subjective, selection criteria.146  As to the 
selection of principal communities, the court held that since 
Warren made this determination by contacting cable operators and 
asking them for information regarding their classification, “the 
selection [was] not its own, but rather that of the cable 
operators.”147 
In another line of cases, courts suggested that the question 
whether an arrangement or selection is not creative under Feist is 
dictated by the question of whether it is “obvious.”  If found to be 
obvious, courts have suggested that the selection and arrangement 
are not copyrightable.  In determining whether a selection is 
obvious—and thus analogous to the plaintiff’s telephone book in 
Feist—courts explored whether it was possible to arrange the work 
in different ways and whether those selections and arrangements 
followed industry standards or conventions.148  When found to 
follow industry standards or conventions, courts usually decided 
that protection was not warranted, given the scarcity of forms of 
expression for selection or arrangement. 
 
 144 Id. at 1517 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006)).  
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 1518. 
 147 Id. at 1519. 
 148 See, e.g., Carmichael Lodge No. 2103 v. Leonard, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84857, at 
*36 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2009) (holding “even when multiple options for selection or 
arrangement are available, the choice from among those options must be non-obvious in 
order to be protectable”); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 
F.3d 522, 536–37 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that Feist is used to show that although a work 
may be set up in many different ways, the possible different ways must also be feasible); 
Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a selection of a 
factual compilation regarding a residential parcel of land was not copyrightable because 
the selection was a matter of following convention and strict industry standards).   
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In summary, after Feist, some courts approach the question of 
original arrangement and selection of a database with caution, 
suggesting that when the selection or arrangement is dictated by 
functional considerations or where the criteria for selection or 
organization are objective, copyright protection will be denied.  
However, some other courts failed to follow Feist’s underlying 
policies and as a result, have afforded copyright protection to 
compilations when not warranted. 
2. Courts’ Search for the “Idea,” “Fact,” and “Expression” of 
Compilations 
The general idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy and 
its corollary, the merger doctrine, are applicable to databases as 
well.149  The idea/expression and the fact/expression dichotomy are 
doctrines of copyright law, providing that “[n]o author may 
copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.”150  These doctrines 
reflect the balance that copyright law seeks to achieve between 
encouraging authors to create new works by protecting their 
original creations from unauthorized copying, while at the same 
time, preserving the basic building blocks of facts and ideas for the 
public domain so that others may use them to create new works.151  
Thus, if protection for a database would prevent others from using 
the database’s ideas or underlying facts, the idea/expression 
dichotomy will be applicable.152  And, if there are a limited 
 
 149 The question of what constitute “facts” for purposes of copyright law has been 
discussed in some cases and in the academic literature. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. 
v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (suggesting that fictitious facts are 
considered expression); Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of 
Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43 (2007).   
150  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985). 
151  See Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 560, 560 (1982). 
 152 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350–51 (1991) (“Facts, 
whether alone or as part of a compilation, are not original and therefore may not be 
copyrighted.  A factual compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an original 
selection or arrangement of facts, but the copyright is limited to the particular selection or 
arrangement.  In no event may copyright extend to the facts themselves.”).  The Feist 
Court, however, never discussed the problem of protecting a factual compilation’s 
underlying idea.  However, in Baker v. Selden, the Court held that copying an idea 
without copying its expression does not constitute infringement. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).  See 
also Mazer v. Stein, 437 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID  NIMMER, 
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number of means to express the database’s ideas, then courts apply 
the merger doctrine and decline to extend copyright protection to 
the database.153 
In 1991, the Second Circuit considered the applicability of 
these two doctrines to the protection of databases in Kregos v. 
Associated Press.154  In Kregos the court found the idea of an 
“outcome predictive pitching form” for baseball not to have 
merged with its expression: the form at issue in the case.155  This 
finding resulted in the reversal of a grant of summary judgment 
against the compiler, Kregos, and the case was remanded for trial 
on the question of whether his pitching form met the required 
creativity standard.156 
 Kregos, the compiler and plaintiff, created a baseball pitching 
form distributed to newspapers that displayed information about 
past performance of the opposing pitchers scheduled to start each 
day’s baseball game.157  The plaintiff’s form listed nine items of 
information about each pitcher’s past performance to assist 
newspaper readers in predicting the outcomes of future games.158  
The plaintiff argued that his compilation was “an outcome 
predictive pitching form” in that he selected pitching statistics that 
he thought were the most important to newspaper readers when 
they were making their predictions on the games.159  The district 
court held for the defendants, ruling that the pitching form lacked 
sufficient originality in its selection of statistics to be copyrightable 
as a compilation and that there were so few ways of selecting 
 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.18[D] (1990).  The doctrine was eventually codified by the 
Copyright Act of 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 153 See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that “even 
expression is not protected in those instances where there is only one or so few ways of 
expressing an idea that protection of the expression would effectively accord protection 
to the idea itself”); see also Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 
1986); Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986).   
 154 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991); id. at 705. 
 155 Id. at 705–07; see also Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 46 F.3d 
408, 409 (5th Cir. 1995). 
156  Kregos, 937 F.2d at 711. 
 157 Id. at 702.   
 158 Id.   
 159 Id. 
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pitching statistics that the pitching form’s idea merged with its 
expression and was thus rendered uncopyrightable.160 
The Second Circuit reversed this decision, holding that, as a 
matter of law, Kregos’s selection of pitching statistics could not be 
rejected for lack of originality and creativity.161  The court 
concluded that because an ample variety of ways to express the 
idea of rating a pitcher’s performance were rejected by Kregos in 
assembling his form, the merger doctrine did not apply.162 
The court started its opinion by warning that the merger 
doctrine must be applied with caution, explaining that if applied 
too readily, the doctrine denies protection to protectable forms of 
expression, while if applied too sparingly the doctrine protects 
ideas.163  The court acknowledged that the application of the 
merger doctrine always depends on the level of abstraction at 
which the idea is stated.164  Moreover, the court explained that a 
reviewing court should exercise particular caution when applying 
the merger doctrine to compilations of facts because the idea of the 
compilation could always be defined as its particular selection of 
facts thus merging the idea into the compiler’s expression of it.165  
Such an application, in effect, eliminates copyright protection for 
 
 160 Id. at 703. 
 161 Id. at 704–05.   
 162  Id. at 707. 
 163 See id. at 705.  Thus, “courts have been cautious in applying the merger doctrine to 
selections of factual information.” Id.; see Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 
533, 540 (finding the doctrine inapplicable to the selection of test questions); Toro Co. v. 
R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (finding the doctrine inapplicable to selection of 
data for numbering parts).  However, it “has been applied on occasion to selections of 
categories of data.” Kregos, 937 F.2d at 705; see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. Kluwer 
Law Book Publishers, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 107, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that the 
plaintiff’s categories of data concerning personal injury awards were “the only sensible 
ones which could have been used to compile the data”).   
 164 Kregos, 937 F.2d at 706. 
165  Id. at 706 (“In one sense, every compilation of facts can be considered to represent a 
merger of an idea with its expression.  Every compiler of facts has the idea that his 
particular selection of facts is useful.  If the compiler’s idea is identified at that low level 
of abstraction, then the idea would always merge into the compiler’s expression of it.  
Under that approach, there could never be a copyrightable compilation of facts.”). 
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compilations.166  Thus, the more generally one defines an idea, the 
less likely it is that the doctrine of merger will apply.167 
In order to prevent such a result and to justify the boundary the 
court had drawn between idea and expression, the court offered an 
alternative view of the doctrine of merger.  The court drew a 
distinction between selections based on “matters of taste and 
personal opinion” and those that are “the first step in an analysis 
that yields a precise result.”168  Protection of the former imposes 
little risk that an idea will be protected while protection of the 
latter imposes significant risk that protection of ideas will occur.169  
Examples of the former include the selection of “premium” 
baseball cards170 or the selection of prominent families to include 
in a social directory.171  As an example of the latter, the court 
presented a hypothetical doctor who publishes a list of symptoms 
useful in diagnosing a disease.172  Where the selection amounts to a 
system yielding a precise result (i.e., the diagnosis of a disease), 
the court recommended that the idea of the selection be formulated 
at a low level of abstraction.173  Thus, the idea of the doctor’s 
selection may be defined as the specific idea that this particular 
group of symptoms identifies a particular disease.174  Defined in so 
specific a manner, no other way to express that specific idea may 
exist and, as a result, the idea merges with the expression.175  
Where the selection is based on taste or personal opinion, however, 
the court recommended a more general formulation of the idea of 
the selection, such that alternative expressions will always be 
possible and the merger doctrine will not apply.176 
Applying this distinction between types of selections of facts to 
Kregos’s pitching form, the court found that his pitching statistics 
 
 166 Id.; see also Ginsburg, No Sweat, supra note 13, at 346–47.  
 167 Kregos , 937 F.2d at 707. 
 168 See id.   
 169 Id. 
 170 See Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).   
 171 See Social Register Ass’n v. Murphy, 128 F. 116 (D.R.I. 1904).   
 172 See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707.   
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
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selection was somewhere in between pure taste and predictive 
analysis.177  Accordingly, the court decided that the plaintiff’s 
selection of the nine pitching-performance characteristics included 
on his form was less than a complete system for weighing each 
performance characteristic—that is, less than a system, method or 
process for determining each team’s probability of winning—but 
was also more than merely his personal opinion of which 
performance characteristics were “most pertinent.”178  Thus, 
because the form differed enough from a system that determined 
outcomes to warrant treatment as a selection reflecting Kregos’s 
own personal taste, the court did not apply the merger doctrine.179  
The pitching form was, therefore, held to be protectable by 
copyright.180 
In CCC Information Services, Inc., v.  Maclean Hunter Market 
Reports, Inc.181 the Second Circuit drew additional and even more 
significant distinctions between different types of selections of 
facts and further complicated its idea/expression and merger 
tests.182  CCC concerned the question of copyrightability of the 
predicted values for used cars in different regions of the country, 
published eight times a year by Maclean Hunter Market Reports, 
Inc. in its Automobile Red Book—Official Used Car Valuations 
(“Red Book”).183  CCC, a computer service, copied substantial 
portions of the Red Book onto its computer network and provided 
 
 177 See Id. 
 178 Id. (“Kregos has been content to select categories of data that he obviously believes 
have some predictive power, but has left it to all sports page readers to make their own 
judgments as to the likely outcomes from the sets of data he has selected.”). 
 179 Id. at 707. 
 180 Id. 
181  44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995). 
 182 Id.; see also CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999).  Analogously, in 
this case, plaintiff CDN published The Coin Dealer Newsletter containing projected 
collectable coin valuations, which were derived from a variety of factors by expertise and 
judgment. Id. at 1260.  CDN alleged that Kapes used its wholesale prices as a baseline to 
arrive at the retail price on its Internet site, and in so doing infringed CDN’s copyright. 
Id. at 1258.  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that CDN’s coin prices, like the car values at 
issue in CCC, were the result of extrapolation and judgment. Id. at 1261.  Accordingly, 
the court held that CDN’s values were not merely facts, but original creations that were 
subject to copyright protection. Id.  
 183 CCC, 44 F.3d at 63.   
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information from it in different forms to its customers.184  CCC 
tried unsuccessfully to obtain a license from Maclean to include 
Red Book values in its on-line services.185  Despite Maclean’s 
refusal, CCC proceeded to use the Red Book valuations, updating 
its figures regularly as new editions of the Red Book were 
published.186  CCC filed suit against Maclean seeking a declaratory 
judgment that its use of the Red Book’s used car valuations did not 
constitute copyright infringement.187  Maclean, the publisher, 
counterclaimed, alleging that CCC’s use of the Red Book 
valuations constituted copyright infringement.188 
The district court found for CCC.  The court held that the Red 
Book’s selection, arrangement, and coordination of data lacked 
sufficient originality to be protected as an “original work of 
authorship.”189  The court also held that the Red Book’s used car 
valuations “were facts, or interpretations of facts, and were, 
therefore, not protected by copyright.”190  Lastly, the court held 
that even if the valuations were not facts, the doctrine of merger 
prevented their protection191 since each Red Book valuation was an 
idea—the idea of the value of a particular used car—that could be 
expressed in only one way: by the dollar figure listed in the Red 
Book.192 
Maclean appealed, seeking to prove that CCC infringed its 
copyright in the Red Book.193  The Second Circuit reversed the 
district court’s ruling, holding that the Red Book was sufficiently 
original to warrant copyright protection, both in its underlying 
data—the used car valuations themselves—and as a compilation.194  
 
 184 Id. at 64.   
 185 Id. at 64 n.3. 
 186 Id. at 64. 
 187 Id.   
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 64 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977)). 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id.   
 192 Id. (“[E]ven if the entries were not facts, copyright protection was nonetheless 
precluded by the doctrine of ‘merger of idea and expression,’ because each entry in the 
Red Book is an idea—the idea of the value of the particular vehicle—and that idea is 
necessarily communicated by a dollar figure.”).   
 193 Id. at 63. 
 194 Id. at 67.   
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Moreover, the court held that the merger doctrine should have been 
“withheld,”195 concluding that Maclean had demonstrated both a 
valid copyright in the Red Book and an infringement of it by 
CCC.196 
The court found sufficient originality in the selection and 
arrangement of data to protect the Red Book as a compilation.197  
Such originality was found in the following aspects of the Red 
Book: (1) division of the national used car market into several 
regions, (2) adjustment of mileage by five-thousand-mile 
increments, (3) choice of which optional features on used cars to 
include, (4) use of the “average” vehicle as the basis for valuation 
in each category, and (5) selection of the number of models per 
year to include.198  Even if the Red Book was not original as a 
compilation of data, the court implied that it was “an original work 
of authorship” because its data reflected creative judgments of its 
editors and were not pre-existing facts at all.199  The Red Book 
valuations were, instead, found to be predictions based on the 
professional opinions of Maclean’s editors and not reports of 
historical prices (considered facts), nor mechanical derivations of 
historical prices (also considered facts).200  The court’s distinction 
between invented or created facts—the used car valuations—and 
historically or mechanically derived facts, suggests the implicit 
adoption of Kregos’s distinction between mechanically selected 
facts and facts which are selected based on subjective opinion.201 
 
 195 Id. at 72. 
 196 Id. at 74.   
 197 Id. at 67 (“We find that the selection and arrangement of data in the Red Book 
displayed amply sufficient originality to pass the low threshold requirement to earn 
copyright protection.”). 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. (“The valuations themselves are original creations of Maclean.”).  The court 
pointed out in a footnote that even though these valuations were just numbers, their 
numerical form is “immaterial to originality.  Original authorship warranting protection 
may be ‘fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . includ[ing ] . . . literary works.’ . 
. . The Act broadly defines literary works to include ‘works, other than audiovisual 
works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols . . . .’” Id. at 
67 n.6 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)).   
 200 Id. at 67. 
 201 See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1991).   
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Deciding that, either way, the Red Book demonstrated enough 
originality to merit copyright protection, the court proceeded to 
evaluate and ultimately reject CCC’s and the district court’s 
application of the idea/expression and merger doctrines.  Instead, 
the court relied on the distinction laid out in Kregos.202 
Understanding the potential risks in application of the 
idea/expression and merger doctrines to the explicit protection 
given to compilations under § 103 of the 1976 Act,203 the court 
emphasized that the level of abstraction could always be adjusted 
in a manner such that the idea of the compilation is defined as its 
particular selection, arrangement, and coordination.204  Such a 
definition would necessarily result in merger of the idea and the 
particular expression in the compilation.205  Therefore, the court 
interpreted the Kregos distinction more broadly, as one between 
types of ideas, some more susceptible to merger than others,206 and 
not as one between types of selections of facts.  The court stated 
that the merger doctrine should apply to those ideas that 
“undertake to advance the understanding of phenomena or the 
solution of problems,”207 like the hypothetical doctor’s 
identification of symptoms for disease diagnosis.  These ideas are 
the “more important and useful kind,”208 constituting “building 
blocks of understanding”209 or “hard” ideas.  The court contrasted 
these hard ideas with “soft” ideas to which the merger doctrine 
should not apply.  These “soft” ideas “do not materially assist the 
understanding of future thinkers,”210 and are usually “infused with 
the author’s taste or opinion.”211  Soft ideas are “weaker,” and they 
“explain nothing, and describe no method, process, or 
procedure.”212 
 
 202 See CCC, 44 F.3d at 70–73. 
 203 See id. at 70 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2005)); see also Kregos, 937 F.2d at 706; 
Ginsburg, No Sweat, supra note 13, at 346. 
 204 See CCC, 44 F.3d at 70. 
 205 See id. at 70–71; see also Ginsburg, No Sweat, supra note 13, at 346. 
 206 See CCC, 44 F.3d at 71. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id.   
 211 Id. at 71. 
 212 Id. at 72–73. 
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The court found support for this distinction between types of 
ideas in the language of § 102(b) of the 1976 Act, which denies 
copyright protection to any “idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”213  The 
court seemed to read this section as capturing the “building blocks” 
theory.  Although § 102(b) does not specifically define “idea,” the 
court read this section of the statute to suggest congressional intent 
to deny copyright protection to the “building block” type of idea 
that explains a process or discovery.214  The court read the same 
dichotomized notion of “idea” into a Copyright Office circular and 
a copyright regulation215 and supported this distinction by other 
Second Circuit case law.  In particular, the court compared the 
outcome of Eckes v. Card Prices Update,216 which granted 
protection to the selection of “premium” baseball cards, with the 
outcome of Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,217 which 
denied protection to a historical theory explaining the fate of the 
Hindenburg.218  The court read the former decision as resting on a 
determination that the selection of “premium” baseball cards was a 
matter of personal opinion and was thus subjective—a “soft” idea 
meriting protection.219  The court read the latter decision as resting 
on a categorization of historical theory as a building-block type of 
“hard” idea that should remain in the public domain.220 
 
 213 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 214 See CCC, 44 F.3d at 71 n.22 (2d Cir. 1994)  (“This dichotomy between types of 
ideas is supported by the wording of various legislative pronouncements, which seem 
uniformly to contemplate denying protection to building-block ideas explaining processes 
or discoveries, and do not refer to expressions of subjective opinion.  Thus, 102(b) denies 
protection to any ‘idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery.’”  (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)). 
 215 Id. (“37 C.F.R. § 202.1(b), in similar terms, denies protection to ‘[i]deas, plans, 
methods, systems, or devices, as distinguished from the particular manner in which they 
are expressed or described in a writing.’  Copyright Office Circular 31 maintains that 
‘Copyright protection is not available for ideas or procedures for doing, making or 
building things; scientific or technical methods or discoveries; business operations or 
procedures; mathematical principles; formulas, algorithms; or any concept, process [or] 
method of operation.’” (citations omitted)). 
 216 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).   
 217 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980). 
 218 See CCC, 44 F.3d at 71. 
 219 Id. at 71 nn.21, 23. 
 220 Id. at 71 n.23. 
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Applying this latter, expanded distinction to the Red Book’s 
used car valuations, the court found that the district court should 
not have applied the merger doctrine because the valuations were 
ideas of the weaker, “soft” category and not the “building-block” 
type of idea.221  This court reasoned that since the valuation 
predictions reflected the opinions of the Red Book editors and were 
not the kind of idea that “illuminates our understanding of the 
phenomena that surround us or of useful processes to solve our 
problems.”222  Therefore, the court held, any copyright-based 
limitations on the public’s access to those valuations involved 
negligible harm, especially when compared to the harm that would 
be inflicted on the compilations’ creators if the merger doctrine 
were applied to prevent enforcement of copyright against 
wholesale takings.223 
These distinctions between “soft” and “hard” facts or ideas 
raise many difficulties.  The Second Circuit’s distinctions between 
fact or idea and expression seem to be problematic, as they rely 
mainly on the measure of the fact’s or idea’s social utility.224  For 
example, it is not at all clear that the Red Book’s used car 
valuations were not the kind of ideas that “illuminate[] our 
understanding of the phenomena that surround us.”225  As 
 
 221 Id. at 72–73.   
 222 Id. at 73. 
 223 Id.  The court stated: 
If the public’s access to Red Book’s valuations is slightly 
limited by enforcement of its copyright against CCC’s wholesale 
copying, this will not inflict injury on the opportunity for public 
debate, nor restrict access to the kind of idea that illuminates our 
understanding of the phenomena that surround us or of useful 
processes to solve our problems.  In contrast, if the merger 
doctrine were applied so as to bar Maclean’s enforcement of its 
copyright against CCC’s wholesale takings, this would seriously 
undermine the protections guaranteed by § 103 of the Copyright 
Act to compilations that employ original creation in their 
selection, coordination, or arrangement.  It would also largely 
vitiate the inducements offered by the copyright law to the 
makers of original useful compilations.   
Id. (citation omitted).  
 224 See Ginsburg, No Sweat, supra note 13, at 346, 379; see also CCC, 44 F.3d at 73. 
 225 See CCC, 44 F.3d at 71–73; see also Irene Segal Ayers, Comment, The “Facts” of 
Cultural Reality: Rewarding the Line Between Fact and Expression in Copyright Law, 67 
U. CIN. L. REV. 563 (1999) (criticizing the court’s distinctions in Kregos and CCC). 
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Professor Ginsburg has argued, all judges exercise this sort of 
judgment of social value whenever they apply the fact/expression 
or idea/expression and merger doctrines.226  The approach taken in 
CCC is problematic exactly because it introduces a subjective 
“test” that provides an opportunity to expand protection to ideas 
and facts. 
Judge Sweet’s partial dissent in Kregos echoed the above 
concerns with the CCC fact/expression analysis.227  Judge Sweet 
argued that it was impossible to apply the merger doctrine to the 
hypothetical doctor’s list of symptoms used to identify and 
diagnose a disease228 while withholding it for Kregos’s pitching 
form.  Disease diagnosis is no less creative and no more scientific 
than predicting the results of a baseball game with the pitching 
form.229  The only distinction between a system for estimating 
sports odds and a system for medical diagnosis is the degree of 
social benefit in each activity.230  Judge Sweet questioned whether 
judgments of social utility should be the basis for distributing the 
protections of copyright law.231 
Kregos’s distinction between opinion or taste-based fact 
selections and those that are outcome-determinative, which 
subsequently developed in CCC into the distinction between “soft” 
and “hard” ideas, was strongly criticized in Continental Micro, Inc. 
v. HPC, Inc.232  This case dealt with the question of whether the 
plaintiff’s code cards, containing space and depth information 
needed by key-cutting machines to cut a specific key, were 
copyrightable.233  The plaintiff argued that such data were 
professional opinions regarding the most effective settings for the 
 
 226 See Ginsberg, No Sweat, supra note 13, at 346. 
 227 See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 711–16 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 228 Id. at 711. 
 229 Id. at 711 n.2. 
 230 Id. at 711. 
 231 Id. (“[T]here is the obvious distinction that a system for making medical diagnoses 
is more socially beneficial than [a] system for estimating sport odds, but such a 
distinction does not offer a basis for denying copyright protection to one while granting it 
to the other.” (citation omitted)). But see CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. 
Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 232 No. 95 C 3829, 1997 WL 102541 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 1997). 
 233 Id. at *1–2.   
C03_BITTON_ 20110425 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  6:41 PM 
2011] PROTECTION FOR INFORMATIONAL WORKS 651 
machine to use to cut particular keys and not non-copyrightable 
facts.234 
The district court pointed to the similarity between the 
plaintiff’s argument and the argument raised in CCC, but rejected 
both as incompatible with copyright law.235  Instead, the court held 
that the code cards’ depth and spacing data were functionally 
different but not expressively different and were thus not 
copyrightable.236  In making its decision, the court relied on the 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Publications International, Ltd. v. 
Meredith Corp.,237 which denied copyright protection for recipes in 
a Dannon yogurt cookbook, explaining that “Mediterranean 
Meatball Salad” and “Swiss ‘n’ Cheddar Cheeseballs” describe 
procedures by which readers can produce dishes and as such, are 
denied protection under copyright law as a procedure, process or 
system.238  This court found that for code cards, just as with a 
recipe, though there may be originality and professional judgment 
in creation, it is not the sort of originality which copyright 
protects.239 
Thus, the Continental Micro test involves determining whether 
the facts, ideas, or a selection thereof, if they are neither “pre-
existing facts” nor original selections, constitute a “procedure, 
process, or system,” or are simply analogous to a recipe.  The test 
does not determine whether facts are “infused with taste or 
opinion.”240  However, this test is obviously applicable and useful 
 
 234 Id. at *3. 
 235 Id. at *4. 
 236 Id.   
 237 88 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996).   
 238 Id. at 481; see also Cont’l Micro, Inc., No. 95 C 3829, 1997 WL 102541, at *3–4.  
(“Plaintiff’s argument is similar to that of the Second Circuit in CCC Information 
Services.  His data, like automobile valuations, are based in part on his opinion of likely 
variances caused by wear and tear on key-cutting machines and by variances among 
types of key blank.  Thus his figures are not facts, he argues, but expressions of his 
opinion.  This argument is an attractive one, but unfortunately, it does not square with the 
law of copyright, at least as [it] has been interpreted in this circuit.”).  
 239 See Cont’l Micro, Inc, 1997 WL 102541, at *4. 
 240 Compare Cont’l Micro, Inc., 1997 WL 102541, at *4. (assessing whether the data 
are facts that constitute a “procedure, process or system” excluded from copyright 
protection), with Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating 
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only in circumstances in which ideas or facts comprise functional 
directions.  For example, application of this test to the facts of 
CCC might lead one to conclude that the Red Book valuations were 
copyrightable since they were not pre-existing facts and did not 
provide a method for determining the value of a used car. 
Although the court attempted to depict this new test as better 
than those used in Kregos and CCC,241 the Continental Micro 
test—attempting to answer whether facts or ideas constitute an 
uncopyrightable “procedure, process, or system”—is really nothing 
more than the flip side of those other tests.  Instead of searching for 
and identifying the protectable elements of the work—fact-
selection based on opinion or taste as in Kregos 242 or “soft” facts 
as opposed to “hard” facts as in CCC243 —the court in Continental 
Micro focused on and searched for the unprotectable elements of 
the work.244 
Recently, however, the Second Circuit issued its decision in 
New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc. v. Intercontinental Exchange, 
Inc.,245 which dealt with questions very similar to those discussed 
in the CCC case.  New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”) is 
an exchange for trading futures and options contracts for energy 
commodities.246  At the end of each day, NYMEX calculates what 
is called the “settlement price.”247  This is the “value, at the end of 
trading each day, of a particular futures contract for a particular 
commodity for future delivery at a particular time.”248  In setting 
the settlement price for these option contracts, NYMEX broke the 
contracts into two groups: those entered into during “high-volume 
months” and those occurring during “low-volume months.”249  For 
 
that “as long as selections of facts involve matters of taste and personal opinion, there is 
no serious risk that withholding the merger doctrine will extend protection to an idea”). 
 241 See Cont’l Micro, Inc., 1997 WL 102541, at *4. 
 242 See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 706–07. 
 243 See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 71–73 
(2d Cir. 1994). 
 244 See Cont’l Micro, Inc., 1997 WL 102541, at *4–5. 
245  497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 246 Id. at 110. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. at 111. 
249  Id. 
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high-volume months, the settlement prices were based on a 
formula.250  The amount of data for low-volume months was lower, 
requiring more data extrapolation and the use of NYMEX’s 
professional judgment.251  NYMEX then published this 
information.252  Defendant Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) was 
a subscriber to the futures values published by NYMEX and used 
these values as is or slightly altered them based on a pre-set 
formula for its customers.253  ICE’s customers then used the 
London Clearing House to complete commodities trades, because 
NYMEX itself could not make the trades.254 
The majority opinion did not squarely address whether the 
calculated values of the futures contracts were “facts.”  Instead, it 
affirmed the district court’s determination of uncopyrightability of 
the values based on the merger doctrine.255  Thus, the court’s 
discussion of Feist is dicta.  In explaining the doctrines of Feist 
and the issues of copyrighting facts, the majority opinion 
referenced Feist’s analogy to the role of a census taker: he or she 
does not create the data but instead discovers it.256  The court thus 
reasoned that its task was to determine if NYMEX’s settlement 
prices constituted original valuations created by NYMEX or 
objective values in the marketplace which NYMEX merely 
discovered.257  The majority stated that on the facts of this case the 
distinction was uncommonly close and there was a strong 
argument that, “like the census taker, NYMEX does not ‘author’ 
the settlement prices as the term is used in copyright law.”258  It 
also suggested that there was a better argument that the settlement 
prices were facts during high-volume months than in low-volume 
months, because of the greater amount of data for use in its 
formulas.259   
 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id.  
 252 Id. at 112. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id.  
 255 Id. at 114–16. 
 256 Id. at 115. 
257  Id. at 114. 
 258 Id. at 114. 
 259 Id. at 116–17. 
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However, the court did not decide the case on the issue of 
whether or not the valuations represented original creations or 
uncopyrightable facts.  Rather, the court assumed without deciding 
that the valuations were original creations, but applied the merger 
doctrine to bar copyright in the values.260  For both high- and low-
volume months, the court explained, NYMEX sought to calculate 
the actual appropriate market valuation, and not just what the value 
should be, is currently, or will be in the future.261  Because the 
court found that the idea (the fair market price of a given contract) 
merged with the only possible expression of that idea (the price), it 
applied the merger doctrine and declined to extend copyright 
protection to NYMEX’s valuations.262 
The concurring opinion by Judge Hall offered a different 
perspective, concurring in all parts of the decision except the 
majority’s discussion of Feist and the factual nature of the 
settlement price.263  He argued that the majority was heightening 
the standard used to determine whether a work displays some 
minimal degree of creativity.264  In particular, Judge Hall disagreed 
with the majority’s dicta concerning the originality of the 
settlement prices for three reasons.265  First, the settlement prices 
were similar to car valuations where the values are determined by 
integrating a number of data sources and combined with 
professional judgment.266  Second, he argued, the majority’s 
argument was circular, because they labeled the settlement prices 
as facts and thus unoriginal.267  (This was despite the majority’s 
instruction that it is unclear whether appropriate values of futures 
contracts can ever be precisely calculated).268  Third, there was 
good reason to doubt that settlement prices were facts.269  They did 
not replicate individual trades, nor the weighted average of the 
 
260  Id. 
 261 Id. at 115. 
262  Id. at 118. 
 263 Id. at 119. 
 264 Id.  
 265 Id.  
 266 Id. at 120. 
 267 Id.  
 268 Id.  
 269 Id.  
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trades, and they also contained an override mechanism which 
enabled NYMEX to change the settlement price as it deemed fit.270 
However, both the majority and the concurring opinions in this 
case seem to be wrong in their analysis of Feist and the question of 
what constitute facts that are ineligible for copyright protection.  
The majority’s analysis concerning the question of whether the 
settlement prices were facts is flawed.  The court’s suggestion that 
the nature of the work should be determined based on the amount 
of data used in reaching the settlement prices is not persuasive.  As 
Judge Hall correctly pointed out, the settlement prices seem to be 
very much like the car valuations at issue in the CCC case.  The 
“author” of the work was indicating a settlement price aimed to 
offer a value for futures and options contracts.  The valuations, 
using data and formulas, aimed to accurately predict their value.  
Very much like the valuations at issue in CCC, the valuations here 
should also be considered facts, regardless of the amount of data 
used to calculate them.  Additionally, creating distinctions between 
valuations or past prices cannot be a valid way to determine what 
should not be copyrightable as facts.  That the valuations attempted 
to predict the value of the futures does not render them no longer 
factual in nature; it simply reflects an attempt to accurately assess 
the futures’ objective value.  The fact that these valuations had not 
yet been confirmed when generated by NYMEX should not make 
any difference to the analysis either.  Neither should the fact that 
different entities offer different valuations of the very same 
product render the valuations any less factual.  Therefore, the 
majority should have made the additional step and determined that 
the valuations were indeed facts.  This would have added clarity to 
the flawed CCC line of cases.271    
All of the tests articulated in the CCC line of cases attest to and 
exemplify the difficulties in determining what should be 
considered a fact or an idea as opposed to the expression of a 
compilation.  However, the question, “Is this or is this not a fact?,” 
 
 270 Id. at 120–21. 
 271 See also Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc., 634 F. 
Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Colo. 2009) (finding star rating and reviews of health care facilities 
copyrightable because the ratings were produced based on a collection of reviews and 
ratings that are analyzed and later arranged to be presented online). 
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is ultimately fruitless.  The real question instead becomes, “What 
kinds of factual information call for some protection and what 
kinds of information really ought to be left free for all to use?”272  
It appears that the courts formulated all these tests in an attempt to 
provide some guidance in the search for the “building blocks” of 
knowledge.  Nonetheless, this does not mean that when the courts 
applied these tests to the cases discussed above they reached the 
correct decisions.  Therefore, the discussion that follows suggests 
the adoption of a complementary “intent test” that might prove 
useful in assessing and determining the nature of the work. 
The present claim is that when the court attempts to determine 
the nature of the work at stake—factual verses non-factual—it 
should try to place itself in the shoes of the work’s creator.  This 
means that the court should try to understand how the creator 
perceived her work and how she wanted the public to perceive it 
when it was commercialized and/or offered to the public.  In other 
words, the court should try to get at the root of the creator’s intent 
regarding the work’s nature.  This search for intention, however, 
must examine objective evidence, such as marketing materials, 
commercial ads, or any other materials which may provide 
circumstantial evidence of how the work’s creator perceived her 
work and how she wanted others to perceive it. 
The relevance of intention in determining a work’s nature is 
not new.  In fact, the famous Israeli Supreme Court decision in 
Eisenman v. Qimron273 illustrates its application.  In this case, the 
plaintiff-respondent was a scholar who reconstructed an ancient 
text in one of the Dead Sea Scrolls from manuscript fragments.274  
The defendants-appellants published the completed reconstructed 
 
 272 Leo J. Raskind, Open Discussion, Copyright Symposium Part I—Copyright 
Protection for Computer Databases, CD-ROMs and Actual Compilations, 17 U. DAYTON 
L.  REV. 351, 358 (1992). 
 273 C.A. 2790/93, 2811/93 Eisenman v. Qimron, 54(3)PD 817 [1993](Isr.), unofficial 
translation available at http://lawatch.haifa.ac.il/heb/month/dead_sea.htm; see also 
David Nimmer, Copyright in The Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 
HOUS. L. REV. 1, 211–12 (2001) (criticizing the decision); Lisa Michelle Weinstein, 
Comment, Ancient Works, Modern Dilemmas: The Dead Sea Scrolls Copyright Case, 43 
AM. U. L. REV. 1637 (1994). 
 274 Qimron, 54(3)PD at 822–23. 
C03_BITTON_ 20110425 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  6:41 PM 
2011] PROTECTION FOR INFORMATIONAL WORKS 657 
text in their book275 without attributing the reconstruction of the 
text to the plaintiff.276  The case dealt with the question of whether 
the plaintiff could secure copyright in the assemblage. 
The appellants’ main argument was that the respondent’s acts 
of supplementing the text were no more than the reconstruction of 
an existing work.  Accordingly, they argued, copyright law should 
not protect the deciphered text.277  However, for reasons to be 
explained shortly, the Court found that the respondent was entitled 
to copyright in the deciphered text.278 
Examining the Israeli court’s analysis in reaching its 
conclusions provides insights into the notion of intentionality.  In 
order to decide the question, the court first defined the subject 
matter of the respondent’s right.  Here, the court distinguished 
between two main components of the deciphered text: the physical, 
tangible, raw material—the fragments of the scroll, created about 
2000 years ago and found in Qumran—and the act of assembling 
the collection of the fragments into a deciphered text—physically 
adding them together, arranging them, deciphering what was 
written on them, and filling the gaps between the fragments.279  In 
other words, the court distinguished between the fragments 
themselves and the art of providing “soul and spirit” to the 
fragments that made them a meaningful and living text. 
The court pointed out that the scroll’s fragments are today in 
the public domain in the sense that anyone who wishes to 
aggregate and decipher them is permitted to do so.280  But the court 
added that the fact that such materials are in the public domain is 
irrelevant to the question of whether the work’s creator has 
copyright in his work.281  The court instead felt that the question it 
faced was whether the spirit and soul that the respondent placed in 
the fragments of the scroll, with the power of his academic 
 
 275 Id. at 823. 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. at 825. 
 278 Id. at 849. 
 279 Id. at 828–29. 
 280 Id. at 828. 
 281 Id. 
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knowledge and talent, make the deciphered text, in its entirety, a 
work protected by the Israeli Copyright Act of 1911.282 
Under Israeli copyright law, a “literary work” enjoys copyright 
protection only if it is an original work of authorship.283  Israeli 
copyright law is also very similar to United States copyright law in 
that it does not provide copyright protection based on the 
industrious collection or sweat of the brow doctrines.284  Protection 
is accorded only to expression and not ideas, facts, or other 
indispensable materials.285 
Relying on these standards, the court moved on to examine 
whether the respondent added something original while 
reconstructing the scroll’s fragments.  The court looked at the 
process by which the collection of fragments became a complete 
text bearing content and meaning.  The court identified several 
phases of “creation”: matching the fragments based on their 
physical compatibility, arranging the matching islands of 
fragments and placing them in their putative place in the scroll, 
deciphering the written text on the fragments (to the extent that 
such deciphering was required) and filling the gaps between the 
fragments.286 
The court then examined whether there was originality in the 
work as a whole.287  The court found no justification to examine 
separately each of the above-discussed phases because the various 
phases of the work were interdependent and had mutual influence 
upon each other.288  For example, deciphering the text dictated to 
some extent the arrangement of the islands of fragments; the 
arrangement influenced the possible meaning of the text, its 
construction and content, and the way of filling the gaps in it.289 
 
 282 Id. at 828–29. 
283  Copyright Act, 5768-2007, 2199 LSI 34 (2007) (Isr.), available at 
http://www.tau.ac.il/ law/members/birnhack/IsraeliCopyrightAct2007.pdf.   
 284 C.A. 513/89 Interlego A/S v. Exin-Lines Bros., S.A., 48(4) PD 133, 165 [1994] 
(Isr.) (“According to the goals of copyright law it is clear that the conclusion is that labor 
is not sufficient to justify according copyright protection.”). 
 285 Qimron, 54(3) PD at 828–29. 
 286 Id. at 832–33. 
 287 Id. at 833. 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id. 
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In the court’s opinion, the work involved in the performance of 
these various tasks revealed uncontestable originality and 
creativity.290  The respondent’s work was not technical or 
mechanical, like simple labor, but rather was original work in that 
he turned the fragments into a living text, applying his knowledge, 
skill, imagination and discretion by choosing among various 
options.291 
However, the court’s discussion clearly left out one major 
argument that might have proved significant to its ruling.  The 
appellants’ main argument was that the respondent’s filling in the 
gaps was not his original work, but was rather a discovery and 
exposition of parts of the original text, as written 2000 years 
ago.292  Thus, the appellants characterized the respondent’s work as 
only a discovery of facts in the framework of historical research 
and, as such, not the subject matter of copyright law.293  Therefore, 
although the respondent had invested effort, time, knowledge, and 
talent, the deciphered text lacked originality.  The fact that no 
original and complete text of the scroll was available from any 
existing source by which to compare it to the deciphered text did 
not transform the deciphered text from a non-copyrightable factual 
work into a copyrightable fictional work.  In fact, the appellants 
argued, since the respondent presented the work as reflecting the 
real text of the scroll, he could not argue that it was an original 
work.  The court did seem to consider this argument, but rejected 
it, instead holding that the respondent’s work was not really a 
reconstruction, but rather his own estimate of what the original 
work really was or should have been.294  As such, the respondent 
created a literary work and did not simply reconstruct an existing 
text. 
Such an analysis clearly ignored the relevance of intention in 
determining originality.  This copyright infringement suit would 
clearly never have been brought had the appellants given credit to 
the respondent for reconstructing the text.  Scholars, such as the 
 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. at 833–34. 
 292 Id. at 825. 
 293 Id. at 831–32. 
 294 Id. at 832–33. 
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respondent, usually care about attribution and recognition more 
than copyrights in their works.295  Of course, the court’s reasoning 
clearly worked to the respondent’s advantage.  However, it is not 
particularly flattering to his scholarly skills.  Indeed, had the 
plaintiff had the same level of knowledge regarding copyright law 
as he does the Dead Sea Scrolls, he would have been disturbed by 
this court’s finding of originality.  The respondent, like every other 
serious historian, obviously intended that his work would be 
perceived as a text that accurately reflected the original text as 
written 2000 years ago.  Attention to the respondent’s intent 
regarding the work’s nature could have led the court to hold that 
the work was unoriginal and, as such, did not merit copyright 
protection. 
Re-examining the courts’ decisions in CCC, Kregos and New 
York Mercantile Exchange in light of the above analysis leads to 
different results.  In CCC, the creators of the Red Book had been in 
the market for a long time.296  They seemed to try to establish 
themselves as the authority or the industry standard in the field of 
used car valuations and wanted consumers to perceive their 
valuations as reflective of the real value of the car and thereby rely 
on them.297  Thus, Red Book wanted its valuations to be viewed as 
facts and not as personal opinions.  That it did not provide the way 
in which it reached the specific values, i.e., the 
procedure/process/system that led it to a given valuation, does not 
make the resulting valuation any less factual in nature.  Similarly, 
in Kregos, the creators of the pitching form viewed this form as 
providing information that consumers could rely on for betting 
purposes to predict a game’s outcome.298  Although the creators 
did not detail the procedure/process/system used to select the 
form’s data or the relative importance of each detail provided, they 
clearly viewed their work as supplying information of predictive, 
 
 295 Kevin Donovan, In an Age of Abundance, Attribution is More Important than 
Copying, TECHDIRT (Aug. 12, 2008, 12:45 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/ 
20080808/2157481936.shtml. 
 296 CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 
1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995).  
 297 CCC, 44 F.3d at 64. 
 298 Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 702 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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i.e., factual, value.299  Lastly, the New York Mercantile Exchange 
court, too, could have employed the intent test to explore the 
question whether the calculated valuations of the future contracts 
were factual. 
While complementary in nature, the test of intentionality might 
bring more works to the public domain.  It appears that the test 
might be helpful in providing some loyalty to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Feist.  It is not easy to determine what should be 
considered fact and what should not.  It is very helpful, however, 
to look objectively at the intention of the creator of the work as 
reflected in objective evidence and, thereby, to try to determine the 
nature of the work as she saw it when she created the work and 
offered it to the public.300 
Indeed, all these tests aim at achieving the same goal: 
preserving the building blocks of knowledge in the public domain.  
 
 299 Id. at 706; see also Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 864 (2d Cir. 1984).  
The court seemed to suggest the possibility of such an argument, but rejected its 
applicability under the case’s circumstances:   
It may be that a copyrighted work, here a listing of premium cards, 
can be so successful that it established the “market,” but there is no 
credible evidence in the record to support application of this theory 
here.  Moreover, there is no basis for such an inference in light of the 
short time in this case between the issuance of appellants’ Guide and 
appellees’ CPU.  In addition, this argument would best be advanced 
in a fair use context, that is, that it is necessary to copy the premium 
cards and prices from appellants’ book because their book establishes 
which cards are premium and the respective prices of each card.  
Id.  
 300 While the intent test has never been recognized explicitly by American courts, there 
exists some case law from which such a test can be implied, mainly based on the estoppel 
doctrine. See Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1992).  Arica Institute is 
a teaching organization that instructs people on finding “inner balance.” Id. at 1069–70.  
The founder of the organization had written extensively on the subject and the work at 
issue in this case (and that was allegedly copied by the defendant) was called “Interviews 
with Oscar Ichazo.” Id. at 1070–71.  At the core of his work were seven fundamental 
“enneogons” associated with nine “ego fixations.” Id.  Some of the enneagons in the 
defendant’s book were quite similar to those in “Interviews.” Id. at 1070–71.  Ichazo, the 
founder of Arica, argued at trial that he discovered the ego fixations and that they were 
scientifically verifiable “facts” of human nature. Id. at 1075–76.  On appeal, the court 
held that Ichazo was estopped from disclaiming that the nine ego fixations were were 
uncopyrightable facts; after having represented to the world that his discoveries were 
factual, the court held, Ichazo could not take back his claim for purposes of the litigation. 
Id. at 1075.   
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This goal can be achieved if courts are cautious and err on the side 
of freeing information instead of enclosing it.  Nonetheless, despite 
the courts’ attempts at vigilance, they seemed to fail in applying 
their newly created distinctions or tests, as the cases described in 
this section have illustrated.  The complementary intent test that 
explores the subjective intent of the work’s creator can assist 
courts in assessing the work’s nature. 
B. Scope of Protection Under the Selection and Arrangement 
Standard 
The Court in Feist clearly held that an original selection or 
arrangement offers minimal, “thin” protection to compilations: 
[A] subsequent compiler remains free to use the 
facts contained in another’s publications to aid in 
preparing a competing work, so long as the 
competing work does not feature the same selection 
and arrangement. . . . [T]he very same facts and 
ideas may be divorced from the context imposed by 
the author, and restated or reshuffled by second 
comers, even if the author was the first to discover 
the facts or to propose the ideas.301 
Thus, copyright law protects only the selection and 
arrangement of a factual compilation; it is limited to the 
components that originated with the author302 and “[i]n no event 
may copyright extend to the facts themselves.”303 
However, Feist does not provide clear guidance regarding the 
scope of protection available to original selections and 
 
 301 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (quoting 
Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value, supra note 35, at 1868).  Thus, “each 
subsequent compiler [need not] start from scratch and is [not] precluded from relying on 
research undertaken by another. Id. at 359.  Rather, the facts contained in existing works 
may be freely copied because copyright protects only the elements that owe their origin 
to the compiler . . . .” Id. at 359 (citations omitted); see also Ginsburg, Creation and 
Commercial Value, supra note 36, at 1868 n.12; L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, 
Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports, 36 UCLA L. 
REV. 719, 776, 800–02 (1989); William F. Patry, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A 
Reply, 6 COMM. & L. 11, 16 (1984).  
 302 Feist, 499 U.S. at 350.   
 303 Id. at 351.   
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arrangements of facts because the Court found Rural’s selection 
and arrangement to be non-copyrightable.304  While it is clear that 
verbatim copying of an entire compilation is not allowed when the 
compilation’s selection or arrangement is original, it remains 
unclear the degree to which non-verbatim copying is prohibited. 
An analysis of the Second Circuit’s decision in Key 
Publications305 sheds light on the extent of copying prevented by 
original selection and arrangement.  In that case, the court refused 
to “read Feist in such a broad and self-defeating fashion”306 as to 
provide that only verbatim copying of the compilation is 
prevented.  Instead, the court stated that subsequent compilers 
cannot avoid infringement liability simply by making minor 
changes to a copyrighted compilation.307  “Such a result would 
render the copyright of a compilation meaningless,”308 the court 
held, resulting in a change of its scope from “thin” to 
“anorexic.”309  The court added that in order to establish copyright 
infringement, a plaintiff must prove “substantial similarity between 
those elements, and only those elements, that provide 
copyrightability to the allegedly infringed compilation.”310  Thus, 
since protection is limited to the original selection and 
arrangement, similarity to those elements must be proven. 
Applying this requirement in Key Publications, the court 
determined that the plaintiff had to show substantial similarity 
between the two directories with regard to their selection of 
businesses or arrangement of categories in order to prevail on its 
 
 304 Id. at 363. 
 305 Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).   
 306 Id. at 514; see also Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 710 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(noting that the defendant’s selection of data must vary from the plaintiff’s by more than 
a trivial degree to avoid infringement). 
 307 Key Publ’ns, Inc., 945 F.2d at 514; see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 583 n.5 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring).   
 308 Key Publ’ns, Inc., 945 F.2d at 514.   
 309 Id. (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)). 
 310 Id. Proof of “substantial similarity” is a basic requirement in establishing 
infringement. Id.; e.g., Bus. Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Freedonia Grp., Inc., 887 F.2d 399, 
402 (2d Cir. 1989); Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863 (2d Cir. 1984); see 
also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] 
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010) (“Just as copying is an essential element of infringement, 
so substantial similarity . . . is an essential element of copying.” (citations omitted)).   
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infringement claim.311  However, the court found no substantial 
similarity in the selections of the data after it examined the key 
issue: “whether the organizing principle guiding the selection of 
businesses for the two publications [was] in fact substantially 
similar.”312  In this case, the defendants’ directory had intentionally 
copied 1,500 of the 2,000 listings from the plaintiff’s directory.313  
The defendants, however, copied only 17% (1,500/9,000) of the 
listings in the plaintiff’s directory and did not completely duplicate 
any category containing more than a few listings.314  The court 
therefore found no infringement of the plaintiff’s selection, 
reasoning that there will always be significant overlap between 
classified directories for a given community.315  Had the 
defendants “exactly duplicated a substantial designated portion” of 
the plaintiff’s directory, the court explained, infringement would 
have been found.316  Thus, original selection allows significant 
copying from the original work as long as the copy does not 
duplicate a substantial portion of the original.317 
As for the substantial similarity test for the “arrangement” 
prong of the Feist standard, the Key Publications court ruled that, 
 
 311 Key Publ’ns, Inc., 945 F.2d at 515.  “[T]he components of a compilation are 
generally in the public domain, and a finding of substantial similarity or even absolute 
identity as to matters in the public domain will not suffice to prove infringement.” Id. at 
514; see also Kregos, 937 F.2d at 709 (2d Cir. 1991) (compilation author is only 
protected against infringement of the protectable features of the compilation); 3 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B][2][b] 
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010). 
 312 Key Publ’ns, 945 F.2d at 516.  Thus, substantial similarity is limited to the 
organizing principle of selection. Id.  However, protection of this principle is limited by 
the idea/expression dichotomy, which limits protection to the expression of an idea and 
denies protection to the idea itself.   
 313 Id. at 515. 
 314 Id.    
 315 Id. at 516.   
 316 Id. at 517; see also Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(finding infringement where a directory duplicated the listing of 5,000 cards designated 
as “premium” in a copyrighted 18,000 card directory). 
 317 But see Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 710 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
the defendant’s compilation would not infringe if it “differs in more than a trivial degree” 
from the plaintiff’s work, essentially creating a “virtual identity” test for infringement); 
Alexandria Drafting Co. v. Amsterdam, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1247, 1253 (E.D. Pa. 1997) 
(holding that copying of features such as positions of symbols and street alignments in 
compilations of maps did not constitute infringement).   
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as a matter of law, the arrangements in the two compilations were 
not substantially similar318 since only three of the twenty-eight 
categories in the defendants’ directory duplicated any of the 260 
categories in the plaintiff’s directory.319  It should be emphasized, 
however, that many of the listings in both directories appeared 
under similar headings.  The court found the placement of listings 
within categories to be “the sort of mechanical task that does not 
merit copyright protection,” but distinguished placement within 
categories from original arrangements of the categories 
themselves.320 
Such a distinction, however, as others have already argued, is 
baseless.321  Neither the placement of listings within a category nor 
other decisions about arrangement in a directory are particularly 
subjective; both seem to be dictated by utilitarian considerations.  
The categories in a classified directory are arranged alphabetically, 
and are therefore clearly unoriginal arrangements under Feist.322  
Likewise, category names are chosen based on what will most 
likely come to mind when a consumer thinks about a product or 
service offered by a business listed within that category.323 
III. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD AND ITS SCOPE TO DATABASES 
Feist’s standard for copyright protection for compilations, 
coupled with the courts’ elaborations on this standard, including 
the courts’ search for the “ideas,” “facts,” and “expression” of 
compilations, all contributed to significant difficulties regarding 
application of this standard to databases.  Furthermore, the scope 
of protection provided under this standard has implications 
regarding producers’ ability to provide meaningful copyright 
protection for their products. 
 
 318 Key Publ’ns, 945 F.2d at 515. 
 319 Id.  
 320 Id.    
 321 See generally John F. Hayden, Recent Development, Copyright Protection of 
Computer Databases After Feist, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 215 (1991). 
 322 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991). 
 323 For example, information about legal services is listed under generic headings such 
as “lawyer” or “attorney.” 
C03_BITTON_ 20110425 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  6:41 PM 
666 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 21:611 
First, most databases are comprehensive in nature.324  They 
therefore do not meet the subjective selection or arrangement 
standard because there is no real selection when the database 
includes the entire universe in a given field.  Indeed, the scope of 
databases is generally based on objective criteria325 so that users 
can exercise and employ their own selection and arrangement of 
the underlying data.326  In the online context, most databases are 
actually exhaustive in nature and do not demonstrate any selection 
or arrangement.  Even the modern Internet-based white pages 
directories allow a user to conduct a limited search rather than an 
exhaustive search.  As a result, most online databases will probably 
easily fail the original arrangement and selection test. 
Second, identifying discernible arrangement within a database 
is difficult.327  The protection of databases that is based on original 
arrangement, therefore, becomes unlikely.328  Even if original 
 
 324 See Brief for Information Industry Association and ADAPSO, The Computer 
Software and Services Industry Association, Inc., as Amici Curiae in support of neither 
party at 19–20 n.16, Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (No. 
89-1909) (arguing that under the original selection standard “copyright protection would 
be afforded to compilations in inverse proportion to their comprehensiveness, which is to 
say (in many cases) to their commercial value and usefulness”); see also Fin. Info. Inc. v. 
Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 507 (2d Cir. 1984) (basing selectivity on the 
omission of facts); Hicks, supra note 100, at 1006 (noting that most compilations “stand 
out for their exhaustiveness and usually contain components selected on the basis of 
objective, not subjective, criteria”).   
 325 See Hicks, supra note 100, at 1006. 
 326 Id. (noting that a compilation listing “all known inhabitants of a city . . . would 
exhibit insufficient subjectivity”). But see id. at 1006–07 (arguing that subjectivity is 
involved even in the selection of objective criteria); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. 
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (finding that the selection of name, town, and telephone 
number “could not be more obvious”). 
 327 The physical arrangement of data within a database is important to the efficiency of 
the database system. See Hicks, supra note 100, at 1014.  This concept of arrangement, 
however, is purely functional, and protection of any original method of physically 
arranging data would surely be barred by the idea/expression dichotomy as embodied in § 
102(b) of the Copyright Act.   
 328 Nat’l Bus. Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, 97 (N.D. Ill. 1982) 
(stating that a database stores information “without arrangement and form”); see also 
Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of 
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 531 (1981) (arguing that “there is no 
particular arrangement to protect”). But see Hicks, supra note 100, at 1022 (criticizing 
this view as “factually incorrect”).  This lack of arrangement is, however, a very positive 
feature of databases since it allows users to arrange data in a format they find most 
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arrangement exists, copyists can simply rearrange the data to avoid 
infringement, without sacrificing the utility of the new database.329 
Third, new technologies enhance the functionality of databases 
in a manner that makes reliance on subjective selection and 
arrangement almost impossible.330  Since new technologies, 
especially developments related to database system software, allow 
easy processing of voluminous amounts of data,331 there is no need 
to exercise subjectivity in selection, as there was for old-fashioned 
databases. 
Fourth, the idea/expression dichotomy and the doctrine of 
merger raise additional challenges for database compilers.  
Specifically, the courts’ formulation of several post-Feist doctrines 
regarding copyright in compilations—as exemplified by courts’ 
attempts to identify the “idea,” “fact,” and “expression” of a 
work—leaves compilers facing increased uncertainty as to whether 
their databases will ultimately be found to be protectable.  The 
court in Kregos explained that the more generally an idea of a 
compilation is defined, the less likely it is that the doctrine of 
merger will apply.332  This need for generality, however, is at odds 
with the subjective selection or arrangement requirement which 
requires that database producers provide instances where 
subjective decisions were made.333  Thus, the interaction of these 
two requirements contributes to even weaker copyright protection 
for databases.  Furthermore, like the hypothetical system in Kregos 
that weighed statistics, database systems generally produce useful 
results, likely to make them fall within the ambit of the merger 
doctrine. 
 
useful. See Hicks, supra note 100, at 1014 (“The database compiler leaves the 
determination of the manner in which data is viewed to the discretion of the user within 
the confines of the software.”). 
 329 See Hicks, supra note 100, at 1023 (noting that rearrangement will avoid 
infringement and that the ease with which a technically proficient party can rearrange the 
data “leads to shallow protection”). 
 330 See Hayden, supra note 321, at 229–31. 
 331 See id. 
 332 See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 333 If subjectivity exists, it will be found in the details of the selection process. See 
Hicks, supra note 100, at 1026.   
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Lastly, the scope of protection provided under the “substantial 
similarity” standard, which prevents verbatim copying, imposes an 
additional limitation on database compilers’ ability to protect their 
products’ original selection and arrangement.  Such a rule prevents 
verbatim copying by parties who lack the technical expertise to 
make minimal changes to the material’s selection or arrangement 
to avoid infringement, in reality deterring only a small group of 
unsophisticated users.  Moreover, significant problems of detection 
and prevention of such behavior, mainly by individual users, 
remain.334 
CONCLUSION 
Feist’s progeny seems to be very troubling for many reasons.  
It fails to provide guidance and coherence regarding key questions 
pertaining to copyright doctrine.  Many courts fail to faithfully 
apply Feist’s holding, finding originality where none exists.  
Courts should exercise more diligence in searching for creative 
selection and arrangement or in distilling the work’s nature (as 
either factual or fictional).  Providing protection for such works 
upsets the delicate balance between what should be protectable by 
intellectual property and what should reside in the public domain.  
Courts can employ the intent test in exploring the work’s nature 
and should exercise more caution when handling works whose 
arrangement and selection is dictated by functional considerations.  
Additionally, it should be pointed out that the creative selection 
and arrangement test for compilations copyright is probably an 
obsolete test for most databases offered online because they most 
often purposefully lack selection and arrangement.335  Therefore, 
given this new environment, this protectability threshold is 
inapplicable to most databases. 
 
 334 Database developers experience significant difficulties tracking individual computer 
systems to determine if they contain illegal copies of their products.  Moreover, the costs 
of bringing individual infringement actions add to this difficulty. See Hicks, supra note 
100, at 1023. 
 335 See Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value, supra note 35, at 1869 (noting that 
arrangement in factual compilations “may bear little, if any, connection to the work’s 
central importance as a source of information”).   
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One might argue that copyright protection based on original 
selection and arrangement is insufficient for modern electronic 
databases and is probably meaningless for most of them, exposing 
them to misappropriation by others thus disincentivizing their 
creation.336  As I have argued elsewhere, this argument is not well-
founded.  There is no empirical evidence that there exists a piracy 
problem in the database industry.337  Therefore, there is no reason 
to make any legislative changes.  If the database industry, other 
producers of fact-intensive works, is able to make the case that a 
problem exists, then we might want to consider the provision of 
some form of protection.  That day has not yet come, so if the 
system is not broken there is no need to fix it . . . . 
 
 336 See, e.g., Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act of 2003: 
Hearing on H.R. 3261 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intell. Prop. of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer 
Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 11 (2003) (statement of 
David Carson, General Counsel, Copyright Office of the U.S. Library of Cong.) 
(“[T]here was a gap in existing legal protection, which could not be satisfactorily filled 
through the use of technology alone . . . . Without legislation to fill the gap, publishers 
were likely to react to the lack of security by investing less in the production of databases 
. . . .”); Collection of Information Antipiracy Act; Trade Dress Protection Act; and 
Continued Oversight of Internet Domain Name Protection: Hearing on H.R. 2652 and 
H.R 3163 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 386–402 (1998) (statement of Daniel C. Duncan, Vice President, 
Government Relation, Information Industry Association) (advocating strong protection 
for databases). 
 337 Miriam Bitton, A New Outlook on the Economic Dimension of the Database 
Protection Debate, 47 IDEA 93 (2006). 
